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A FEW WORDS ABOUT WOMEN IN THE DISCOURSE OF 
CRIMINAL LAW UPON READING MARTHA GRACE 
DUNCAN’S ESSAY, BEAUTY IN THE DARK OF NIGHT 
Nancy Cook∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
One key idea in Martha Grace Duncan’s essay, Beauty in the Dark of 
Night: The Pleasures of Form in Criminal Law, is that in our justice system, 
“criminal law represents the juncture where state and individual interact in the 
most dramatic way; the point at which the state goes furthest in exerting its 
authority over the citizen.”1  This intersecting place or moment “inextricabl[y] 
link[s] . . . authority and violence.”2  Professor Duncan follows this 
observation with another: the potent connectivity of authority and violence in 
the criminal law context offers a striking, almost eerie, contrast to the language 
that is often used by courts in analyzing, from a legal perspective, the thorny 
conflicts arising from state–citizen interactions related to crime and 
punishment.  The harsh realities of crime, victimization, trial, and 
imprisonment—all laden with pain and violence—are discussed in opinions 
laced with antiquated poetic language, beautiful imagery, and soft sounds.3  
Professor Duncan herself constructs similarly unlikely literary pairings in her 
writing about criminal law texts, interweaving the languages of story and 
witness into the academic discourse of a law journal essay.4 
Part I of my response to Professor Duncan’s essay will underscore a few 
points Professor Duncan makes about how the beauty of the language of 
criminal law is manifested in case law.  To illustrate this concept, I rely on 
Professor Duncan’s examples of cases involving depraved heart, heat of 
passion, attempt, and the castle doctrine are used to illustrate.  I also explore 
one implicit question in Professor Duncan’s essay: Why has this antiquated 
language been preserved?  I offer three answers, drawing from examples 
 
 ∗ Vaughan G. Papke Professor of Clinical Law and Director of the Lawyering Program at University of 
Minnesota Law School.  
 1 Martha Grace Duncan, Beauty in the Dark of Night: The Pleasures of Form in Criminal Law, 59 
EMORY L.J. 1203, 1244 (2010). 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. 
 4 See, e.g., id. at 1226–27. 
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provided by Professor Duncan’s essay.  In brief, Part I identifies the primary 
reasons suggested by Professor Duncan: an intentional evasion of precise 
definition, exploitation of the evocative power of language to promote a 
particular understanding, and renewal of precedent by making indirect 
associational links to familiar history. 
Part II raises a different question: Why should it matter now, to practicing 
lawyers, that criminal law is steeped in outdated, quixotic language?  To 
answer this question, I have chosen to look at a particular context generally 
alluded to, but not directly addressed in, Professor Duncan’s essay.  
Specifically, my goal is to discover what implications the peculiar language of 
criminal law has for women who find themselves enmeshed in the criminal 
justice system, whether as defendants, convicted inmates, or crime victims.  
Here, I focus on the “inextricable link to authority and violence”5 present in the 
criminal justice system and on the contrast between the hardness of gory, 
grizzly details and the softness of imagery used to describe the crimes.  
Referencing the three previously noted methodologies (evasion of precise 
definition, exploitation of evocative power, and use of associational links to 
history), I discuss how the language of criminal law has special application to 
situations involving women in the system.  Again, the concepts highlighted 
here are depraved heart murder, the heat of passion defense, attempt, and self-
defense. 
Finally, Part III attempts to demonstrate, through poetic form, just how 
pervasive and compelling the literary language of the criminal law is.  Using 
excerpts from various texts, such as court opinions, news reports, academic 
texts (including Professor Duncan’s essay), true-crime stories, personal 
narratives, confessions, and testimony, I present a documentary collage 
intended to break down artificial constructs of knowledge and provide 
evidence of the extent to which our assumptions about crime and women in the 
criminal justice system are subject to the power of language detailed in 
Professor Duncan’s essay. 
 
 5 Id. at 1244. 
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I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE HOW AND WHY 
A. How the Antiquated Language of Criminal Law Is Preserved 
In her essay, Professor Duncan examines the tendency of courts to preserve 
antiquated—and often romantically resonant—language in the criminal law 
context.  This responsive essay focuses on particular manifestations of this 
tendency identified by Professor Duncan: language relating to murder, 
specifically references to depraved heart and heat of passion; terms used in 
discussions of attempt crimes, particularly those relating to time and place; and 
the lexicon of self-defense, with its connection to history and culture. 
1. Depraved Heart 
Professor Duncan takes us through several epistemological levels in her 
discussion of murder.  She begins by demonstrating how criminal law uses the 
metaphors of body and heart to elucidate concepts of mens rea.6  Courts have 
repeatedly described a perpetrator’s state of mind as a state of heart: The guilty 
murderer suffers from “hardness of heart,”7 a “depraved heart,” an “abandoned 
and malignant heart,”8 and a heart “fatally bent on mischief.”9  The evil heart is 
the source of the criminal’s “wickedness.”10 
2. Heat of Passion 
The heart is understood to be a source of heat, as well as of emotion, and 
from the heart metaphor comes the language of fire.  As Professor Duncan 
notes, the case law is replete with such language, beginning with the primary 
idiom heat of passion, which serves as shorthand for a particular kind of loss of 
control and justifies the reduction of murder to manslaughter.11  The fire 
metaphor embedded in the expression heat of passion has been extended to 
cover other aspects of murder defenses discussed in case law.  Courts speak of 
the parties’ emotions “cooling off” or “rekindling.”12  As Professor Duncan 
 
 6 See id. at 1205. 
 7 People v. Roe, 542 N.E.2d 610, 618 (N.Y. 1989) (Bellacosta, J., dissenting); Commonwealth v. 
McLaughlin, 142 A. 213, 215 (Pa. 1928).  For Professor Duncan’s discussion of depraved heart murder and 
these cases in particular, see Duncan, supra note 1, at 1206.    
 8 JOHN KAPLAN ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW 384 (2004). 
 9 Id. (quoting Mays v. People, 806 Ill. 306 (1883)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 10 McLaughlin, 142 A. at 215. 
 11 See Duncan, supra note 1, at 1206. 
 12 Id.  
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also points out, the event that is generally relied on to justify a heat of passion 
defense is one spouse’s discovery of the other in flagrante delicto—literally, 
“in the blaze of transgression.”13 
As the heat of passion defense evolved, courts and legislatures sometimes 
broadened its reach beyond the adulterous spouse situation.  In some 
jurisdictions, therefore, the operative term is “extreme emotional 
disturbance.”14  While this term lacks a direct connection to the fire metaphor, 
the defense retains the correlative language through a large body of 
jurisprudence.  Cases that discuss extreme emotional disturbance15 abound 
with terms like “simmering,”16 “inflamed,”17 “hot blood[ed],”18 
“smouldering,”19 and “ignited.”20 
3. Locus Poenitentiae 
When looking at the law of attempt, Professor Duncan highlights court 
opinions that emphasize notions of mercy and the potential for redemption.21  
As she observes, courts have long voiced the belief that crime is constituted by 
both mens rea and actus reus; until the moment of action, the mind can be 
dissuaded from criminality.22  In Latin—the Christian language of guilt and 
salvation—between temptation and sin lies locus poenitentiae, the place of 
repentance.23  In recognition of this principle, Professor Duncan notes a 
Missouri case stating that “the law in its beneficence extends the hand of 
forgiveness.”24 
 
 13 Id. at text accompanying note 74 (quoting JOSEPH T. SHIPLEY, THE ORIGINS OF ENGLISH WORDS 32 
(1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 14 Duncan, supra note 1, at 1206. 
 15 State v. Kaddah, 736 A.2d 902, 911 (Conn. 1999); Boyd v. State, 389 A.2d 1282, 1288 (Del. 1978); 
People v. Patterson, 347 N.E.2d 898, 908 (N.Y. 1976).  For Professor Duncan’s discussion of these and other 
cases that discuss extreme emotional disturbance, see Duncan, supra note 1, at 1206 n.15. 
 16 Kaddah, 736 A.2d at 911. 
 17 McClellan v. Commonwealth, 715 S.W.2d 464, 469 (Ky. 2006). 
 18 Patterson, 347 N.E.2d at 908. 
 19 People v. Walker, 473 N.Y.S.2d 460, 466 (App. Div. 1984). 
 20 Id. 
 21 See Duncan, supra note 1, at 1221–22. 
 22 Id.  
 23 King v. Barker, 43 N.Z.L.R. 865, 873 (1924). 
 24 Duncan, supra note 1, at 1222 (quoting State v. Hayes, 78 Mo. 307, 317 (1883)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
COOK GALLEYSFINAL 9/10/2010  10:30 AM 
2010] WOMEN IN THE DISCOURSE OF CRIMINAL LAW 1249 
4. The Castle Doctrine 
One final subject covered by Professor Duncan merits attention: the domain 
of self-defense.  In her examination of the language of criminal law, Professor 
Duncan demonstrates the connectivity of the case law language to Anglo-
American history and, in particular, to our feudal past.25  Building from the 
precept that necessity is the “soul of . . . self defense,”26 courts have devised 
the castle doctrine, implicitly concluding that one’s home is inextricably linked 
to one’s self.  Defense of home is defense of self; retreat from one’s home is no 
more expected than retreat from one’s very self.  “[W]hither shall he flee?” 
asked one court in 1884.27  Although “retreat to the wall”28 may be demanded 
in a public space, a “true man” is entitled to stand and fight when he (or his 
home) is threatened.29  “Flight is for sanctuary and shelter, and shelter, if not 
sanctuary, is in the home.”30  Home, moreover, is a private domain, the 
equivalent of a castle, where the owner is subject to no other. 
B. Why the Antiquated Language of Criminal Law Is Preserved 
Having clearly demonstrated that criminal law has preserved a language 
steeped in history, Professor Duncan explains some of the reasons why.  She 
elaborates on three rationales that bear on matters discussed in Part II of this 
response.  They are intentional evasion of precise definition, exploitation of the 
evocative power of language to promote a particular understanding, and 
renewal of precedent through indirect associational links to familiar history. 
1. Intentional Evasion of Definition 
Professor Duncan points out that a number of key elements in criminal law 
are not clearly defined.  The words malice aforethought, for example, do not 
mean what they appear to mean.31  Legal experts and courts acknowledge the 
ambiguity.32  In fact, the concept has been described as “inscrutable on its 
 
 25 Id. at 1232–33 nn.182–86 and accompanying text. 
 26 United States v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222, 1235 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
 27 Jones v. State, 76 Ala. 8, 16 (1884). 
 28 MARTIN R. GARDNER & RICHARD G. SINGER, CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT 1070 (4th ed. 2004).  For 
Professor Duncan’s discussion of self-defense, the duty to retreat, and the castle doctrine, see Duncan, supra 
note 1, 1230.  
 29 Erwin v. Ohio, 29 Ohio St. 186, 199–200 (1876). 
 30 New York v. Tomlins, 107 N.E. 496, 497 (N.Y. 1914).  For Professor Duncan’s discussion of this 
quote, see Duncan, supra note 1, at 1234. 
 31 See Duncan, supra note 1, at 1207 n.20. 
 32 Id. 
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face”33 and “a term of art, if not a term of deception.”34  Similarly, the 
premeditation–deliberation formula, which distinguishes first- and second- 
degree intentional murder, has been criticized as a “mystifying cloud[] of 
words,”35 “notoriously unhelpful,”36 and a “‘collection of colorful verbiage,’ 
that ‘tend[s] to carry more flavor than meaning.’”37  The ambiguity is arguably 
deliberate and strategic.38  It is also, arguably, reflective of the complexity of 
the subject matter. 
Many in the field disdain criminal law’s figurative language, with its 
inevitable ambiguity.39  The American Law Institute (ALI), for example, 
clamors for more precision in a climate demanding public exactitude.40  But 
Professor Duncan defends the aging language, applauding its breadth and 
expressiveness.41  The language, she says, is self-transcendent, “vibrant with 
contradiction.”42  In contrast to what she denotes as the ALI’s call for “steno-
language,”43 Professor Duncan advocates caution and reminds us of the 
benefits of flexibility in this difficult area of law.44 
2. Evocative Power 
A second reason the language has been preserved is its evocative power, of 
which, almost certainly, judges are well aware.  As Professor Duncan notes, in 
the “area of yearning,” beauty is objective and subjective.45  Beautiful 
language uses this evocative power to transport readers to another place or 
 
 33 Paul H. Robinson et al., The Five Worst (and Five Best) American Criminal Codes, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 
1, 43 (2000). 
 34 GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 208 (1978). 
 35 BENJAMIN CARDOZO, WHAT MEDICINE CAN DO FOR LAW 27 (1930).  For Professor Duncan’s 
discussion of the premeditation–deliberation formula, see Duncan, supra note 1, at 1236.  
 36 Suzanne Mounts, Malice Aforethought in California: A History of Legislative Abdication and Judicial 
Vacillation, 33 U.S.F. L. REV. 313, 313 (1999). 
 37 Duncan, supra note 1, at 1237 (quoting CRIMINAL LAW: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 362 (Kate E. 
Bloch & Kevin C. McMunigal eds., 2005) and CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 441 (Sanford H. Kadish & 
Stephen J. Schulhofer eds., 7th ed. 2001)). 
 38 Duncan, supra note 1, at 1237. 
 39 Id. at 1237. 
 40 See id. at 1237. 
 41 See id. at 1237–38. 
 42 Id. at 1238. 
 43 Id. 1238 n.231 (“Steno-language refers to utterances that have a ‘fixed set of associations,’ the same in 
every context.” (quoting PHILIP WHEELWRIGHT, THE BURNING FOUNTAIN: A STUDY IN THE LANGUAGE OF 
SYMBOLISM 50 (rev. ed. 1968) (emphasis added))). 
 44 See id. at 1238. 
 45 Id. at 1226 (quoting GEORGE HAGMAN, AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE 97 (2005)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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time.  In the imagery of the language of the criminal law, Professor Duncan 
sees “fullness of expression,”46 an organic and interactive system of 
communication.  According to Professor Duncan, the particular evocative 
power of criminal law’s language reflects the ethos of the Romantic 
movement, as opposed to that of the Enlightenment when language tended 
toward the concrete and literal as an affectation of scientific thinking.47 
By opting for the evocative power of language over the persuasive logic of 
scientific analysis, some criminal law courts have been able to retain their 
discretionary power.  Professor Duncan provides several examples of judges 
whose opinions illustrate this point: Justices Jackson and Fortas and Judge 
Cardozo all exploited the evocative power of language.  Using the example of 
Morisette v. United States, Professor Duncan shows how Justice Jackson 
manipulates language through contrast,48 alliteration,49 and romantic motifs.50  
Professor Duncan also highlights how Justice Fortas’s opinion in In re Gault51 
employs images of England’s feudal past—the medieval serf and lord—as a 
metaphor for the twentieth century relationship between citizen and state52 and 
uses the romantic imagery of nature to discuss the due process rights of 
juveniles.53  Judge Cardozo also relies on the power of subliminal Romantic 
motifs, as evidenced in People v. Tomlins.54 
3. Associational Links 
One final rationale Professor Duncan posits for preserving language is the 
ability of courts to incorporate large swaths of history through association or 
allusion.  A reference that brings to mind, whether consciously or not, deep-
seated lessons learned or beliefs imparted makes the task of renewing 
precedent relatively easy.  An example of this provided by Professor Duncan is 
the term malice aforethought, which is described as “fraught with 
 
 46 Id. at 1238. 
 47 Id. at 1238. 
 48 See id. at 1212. 
 49 See id. at 1212–13. 
 50 See id. at 1213. 
 51 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 52 Duncan, supra note 1, at 1220. 
 53 Id. at nn.86–87 and accompanying text. 
 54 107 N.E. 496, 497 (N.Y. 1914).  For Professor Duncan’s discussion of Tomlins, see Duncan, supra 
note 1, at 1233. 
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background”55 or “laden with accreted meaning.”56  This phrase, she says, is a 
“language event,”57 meaning the very term carries history with it.58  While 
Professor Duncan examines specific feudal associations of castles and the 
monarchy,59 she also develops the idea of imagery associated with historical 
periods, light and darkness, time and mortality.60  This imagery has 
considerable impact on criminal law as it relates to women today. 
II. IMPLICATIONS FOR WOMEN IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
This Part address the implications of Professor Duncan’s exploration of the 
peculiar language of criminal law for women who find themselves enmeshed 
in the criminal justice system.  This is a theme generally alluded to, but not 
directly addressed in, Professor Duncan’s essay.  I posit that whether they are 
involved in the system as defendants, convicted inmates, or crime victims, 
women are decisively affected by the language patterns described by Professor 
Duncan. 
In looking at how the old and beautiful language of the criminal law applies 
specifically to women, it is useful to return to Professor Duncan’s premise that 
criminal law is the “juncture where the state and the individual interact in the 
most dramatic way”;61 where, in fact, the state’s authority over its citizens is 
most keenly felt.  At this juncture, authority and violence are conjoined.62  
Ironically, it is here that courts are prone to invoke Romantic imagery or misty 
language, defining essential elements of crime and the state’s role in 
administering justice in terms that are both evocative and ambiguous.  The 
characteristics of language that Professor Duncan observes in criminal law 
cases are pervasive throughout criminal justice discourse as it relates to 
women, and that discourse takes place in court opinions, academic texts, news 
reports, testimony, and everyday storytelling.  In this exploration of the 
language of criminal law as applied to women throughout history, I have 
 
 55 ERICH AUERBACH, MIMESIS: THE REPRESENTATION OF REALITY IN WESTERN LITERATURE 12 (Willard 
R. Trask trans., Princeton Univ. Press 1953) (1946).  For Professor Duncan’s discussion of malice 
aforethought, see Duncan, supra note 1, at 1208.  
 56 Id.  
 57 NORTHROP FRYE, THE GREAT CODE: THE BIBLE AND LITERATURE 60 (1982).  
 58 For Professor Duncan’s discussion of malice aforethought as a language event, see Duncan, supra note 
1, at 1208. 
 59 See id. at 1229–34. 
 60 Id. at 1238–43. 
 61 Id. at 1243. 
 62 Id. 
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chosen to rely on a small but varied selection of texts.  My choice of texts is 
not random, nor is it the result of a lengthy and involved search.  From a vast 
array of documentary materials, I have selected what I believe to be a 
representative group: news reports of lawsuits against the Michigan 
Department of Corrections (MDOC), oral histories of women living and 
working inside the prison system, academic texts about women and crime, 
true-crime stories, and court opinions, including many cases cited in Professor 
Duncan’s essay.  Specific applications are particularly noted in reference to 
depraved heart murder, heat of passion, attempt, and the castle doctrine. 
A. Historical Perspectives and Literary Manifestations 
1. Depraved Heart: Body 
A brief look at how the language of “abandoned and malignant heart”63—
and more generally the metaphors of mind, body, and heart—has historically 
been integrated into the criminal justice system sheds light on that system’s 
treatment of women.  The era known as the Enlightenment was characterized 
culturally by society’s belief in the power and importance of reason.  “The 
eighteenth century,” it has been noted, “witnessed in general a certain 
‘euphoria about the possibility of systemisation and rationalisation.’”64  During 
this time, therefore, vice came to be regarded as conduct outside this dominant, 
presumptively male norm; if man is basically a rational being, the only 
explanation for irrational conduct, such as murder, must be that it occurs 
outside the realm of the rational.  Accordingly, it was said, “[n]othing is more 
certainly true than that all Vice is unnatural and contrary to the nature of 
Man.”65  It has also been noted that “[w]ithin the Enlightenment world view, 
[serious crime] was caused by some combination of environmental influence, 
motive, and uncontrolled passion.”66  Language of this period, in opposition to 
 
 63 KAPLAN ET AL., supra note 8, at 384. 
 64 SUSAN CHAPLIN, LAW, SENSIBILITY AND THE SUBLIME IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY WOMEN’S FICTION: 
SPEAKING OF DREAD 31 (2004) (quoting SUSAN STAVES, MARRIED WOMEN’S SEPARATE PROPERTY IN 
ENGLAND 1660–1883, at 15 (1990)). 
 65 KAREN HALTTUNEN, MURDER MOST FOUL: THE KILLER AND THE AMERICAN GOTHIC IMAGINATION 47 
(1998) (quoting Benjamin Whichcote, The Glorious Evidence and Power of Divine Truth, in THE CAMBRIDGE 
PLATONISTS: BEING SELECTIONS FROM THE WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN WHICHCOTE, JOHN SMITH, AND 
NATHANAEL CULVERWEL 1, 25 (Ernest Trafford Campagnac ed., 1901)).  In this era, the word “Man” referred 
explicitly to males. 
 66 Id. at 45–46. 
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the much-lauded ideal of scientific detachment, reflects the notion that felons 
must be “cold-blooded” and “insensib[le].”67 
Physiological metaphors were commonly used to aid comprehension.  “A 
depraved and vicious Mind is as really the Sickness and Deformity thereof, as 
any foul and loathsome Disease is to the Body,” proclaimed seventeenth-
century Cambridge Provost and Platonist founder Benjamin Whichcote.68  By 
the mid-eighteenth century, the term “cold-blooded killer” had become a 
mainstay of American murder reports.69  Similar phrases proliferated; for 
example, three “hard-hearted” men were said to have been hired by a woman 
to kill her husband in “cool blood.”70  Accounts of the cases of other accused 
murderers reported that the crimes were committed “out of ‘a cool deliberate 
wickedness of thought,’71  or with a ‘heart obdurate to all the feelings of 
nature.’”72  The accused “remained an ‘unfeeling fiend,’73 ‘insensible’ of 
wrong-doing after the deed was done.”74 
By the early twentieth century, the metaphorical body language of criminal 
law found its way into popular literature.  A notable cultural phenomenon of 
the period was the rise in popularity of detective stories, crime novels, and 
murder mysteries, many authored by women.  Agatha Christie, Dorothy 
Sayers, and others broke into the fiction market with tales depicting the 
“middle classes . . . thoroughly riddled with dirty secrets.”75 
Karen Halttunen notes that the popular literature of murder in the 
nineteenth century cultivated ties between sex and violence.  Through both 
fictional and nonfictional genres emanated 
 
 67 Id. at 46. 
 68 Whichcote, supra note 65 (emphasis added). 
 69 HALTTUNEN, supra note 65, at 45 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 70 Id. (quoting NATHAN FISKE, A SERMON PREACHED AT BROOKFIELD, MARCH 6, 1778, ON THE DAY OF 
INTERNMENT OF MR. JOSHUA SPOONER 6 (Thomas & John Fleet 1778)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 71 Id. (quoting GEORGE KEATING, TRIAL OF JOHN GRAHAM AT BALTIMORE COUNTY CRIMINAL COURT ON 
TUESDAY AUGUST 7, 1804, at 17 (Frayer & Clark 1804)). 
 72 Id. (quoting TRIAL OF EDWARD TINKER, MARINER, FOR THE WILLFUL MURDER OF A YOUTH CALLED 
EDWARD AT CARTERET SUPERIOR COURT, SEPTEMBER TERM 1811, at 42–43 (Hall & Bryan and T. Watson 
1811)). 
 73 Id. (quoting CONFESSION OF JOHN JOYCE, ALIAS, DAVID, WHO WAS EXECUTED ON MONDAY, THE 
14TH OF MARCH, 1801, FOR THE MURDER OF MRS. SARAH CROSS 111 (Philadelphia 1808)). 
 74 Id. (quoting A CORRECT AND CONCISE ACCOUNT OF THE INTERESTING TRIAL OF JASON FAIRBANKS, 
FOR THE BARBAROUS AND CRUEL MURDER OF ELIZABETH FALES AT THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT, HOLDEN 
AT DEDHAM,  IN THE COUNTY OF NORFOLK, STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS, ON TUESDAY AUGUST 4, 1801 
(Boston c. 1801)). 
 75 FRANCES GRAY, WOMEN, CRIME AND LANGUAGE 28 (2003). 
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a major expression of the new pornography of pain and violence, 
providing both an abundance of body-horror to cater to the new 
excitement and a steady stream of disclaimers and apologies for its 
own sensationalism, which merely reinforced the illicit thrill of 
reading such literature.  Murder literature was closely related to 
sexual pornography, through its tendency to fuse sex with violence 
on the grounds of their common obscenity, and its special interest in 
crimes of passion, rape-murders, prostitute-killings, and abortion-
homicides.76 
Before the century was out, murder stories featuring women as sexual 
objects and sexual actors were firmly grounded in popular literature.77  The late 
nineteenth century especially saw growth in the publication of gendered 
murder tales: 
Readers were ushered into a world where pregnant single women 
died at the hands of inept abortionists; rape victims were murdered by 
their sexual assailants; rejected lovers killed their scornful 
sweethearts, and successful seducers killed their pregnant cast-offs; 
prostitutes were killed by their most favored clients; jealous husbands 
murdered faithless wives, and adulterous husbands killed faithful 
wives to mate with other women; husbands and brothers avenged the 
honor of their women by killing their seducers; and experimenters in 
sexual unorthodoxy saw their innovative arrangements erupt in 
deadly violence.78 
By following some of the most sensational trials of the nineteenth century, 
it is possible to see how linguistic shifts and developments played out in the 
law itself.  Over time, the language of mind and heart, reason and passion, 
virtue and vice, self-control and violence was superimposed on the gendered 
language of sex and male–female relationships. 
In a nineteenth-century case, for example, we learn that James Eldredge 
killed Sarah Jane Gould.79  As the prosecutor told the story, the accused 
enticed his victim into a sexually compromising situation.  From this evidence, 
the jury could infer that Eldredge, acting outside the realm of reason, was 
depraved.  Eldredge, the prosecutor argued, had “beguiled the woman” and 
“defiled her with his filthy embrace” before “cast[ing] his baleful eyes upon 
 
 76 HALTTUNEN, supra note 65, at 83. 
 77 Id. at 173. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. at 179. 
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another object of desire” (Gould’s sister).80  He then “struck his envenomed, 
poisoned fangs, into her bosom.”81  In this case, the male defendant is the 
deviant, and it is his contemptible body and his conduct that are described with 
such colorful language. 
Before long, however, criminal law discourse began to reflect the 
sexualization of violence—a situation in which sex, deemed to be a 
presumptively female province, is pitted against male violence.  In this 
shadowbox, only one of two factors—sex or violence—is deemed the primary 
causal element.  An 1836 case involving the murder of Helen Jewett, a twenty-
three-year-old prostitute, is an example of how conflicting stories emerged in 
the legal world.82  Evidence in the case strongly supported a finding that 
Richard Robinson had committed the crime, killing Jewett  with a hatchet blow 
to her head and then burning her body in her bed.83  The defense framed the 
question as one of competing credibility: of “reputable men” against 
“disreputable women.”84  This categorization placed the defendant Robinson 
squarely within the convention of the rational man—not cold, hard, or 
insensible. Accordingly, some other explanation for his apparently irrational 
(i.e., cold-hearted) behavior was needed.  The explanation given in the press 
was that he had been fooled and entrapped by the women’s appearance of 
innocence.85  Sexuality, situated in the woman, was at fault.86 
Robinson was acquitted after fifteen minutes of deliberations.87  The trial 
judge had helped the defense by instructing the jury to disregard testimony by 
“persons who lead most dissolute lives—who were inmates of a house of a bad 
description . . . a house engaged in destroying both sexes.”88  Although 
Robinson killed Jewett, he was “reputable”—a man whose heart was 
 
 80 Id. at 179 (emphasis omitted) (quoting THE TRIAL FOR MURDER OF JAMES E. ELDREDGE, CONVICTED 
OF POISONING SARAH JANE GOULD 118 (Hitchcock, Tillotson & Stilwell’s Steam Presses 1857)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 81 Id. at 179 (emphasis omitted) (quoting THE TRIAL FOR MURDER OF JAMES E. ELDREDGE, supra note 
80, at 118) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 82 See id. at 199. 
 83 Id. at 199–200. 
 84 Id. at 202–03 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The defense argued that Robinson had not killed 
Jewett and suggested, without producing any affirmative evidence, that another prostitute may have murdered 
her.  Id. 
 85 Id.  
 86 See id. at 203 (“The Jewett murder offers the supreme example of how the violent death of a fallen 
woman could be shaped by a Gothic narrative of sexual danger and ultimate guilt borne by the female of the 
species.”). 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. 
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apparently not depraved, and therefore not blameworthy.  The women in the 
brothel, and the deceased in particular, were never explicitly identified as 
culpable parties, but the brothel was said to be hiding an unnamed evil, one 
that was responsible for “destroying both sexes.”  Within a few decades, that 
evil came to be identified explicitly as female passion or, sometimes, simply 
female sexuality. 
One of the best known criminal cases of the nineteenth century involved 
the murders of five women within close proximity to each other in the 
Whitechapel district of London, committed by an unknown perpetrator who 
came to be called “Jack the Ripper.”89  It has been argued that the unsolved 
crimes, which were committed in 1888, marked the beginning of “The Age of 
Sex Crime.”90  Each of the victims had some involvement in prostitution, a 
factor that received intense attention in the press and in the multiplicity of 
fictional and nonfictional stories that were written about the case.91  Intrigue 
was generated not only by reference to the depraved heart of a presumably 
irrational man, but also by the implicit depravity of the victims.  The 
conventional story line established these elements as an oppositional 
dichotomy, one that would prove difficult to maintain. 
Such dueling narratives of sex and violence may have been heralded by 
Lord Blackstone.  They perhaps first arose not in reference to guilt, but in the 
context of legal responsibility.  Having decreed that a woman loses her status 
as an individual when she marries, Blackstone was forced to contemplate who 
should be responsible for a wife’s commission of a crime.92  It was decided 
that a married man would be held responsible for crimes committed by his wife 
with three exceptions: treason, murder, and keeping a brothel.93  The last 
exception is consistent with the idea that however much a woman’s identity 
was subsumed in her husband’s, the circumstances in which a man would have 
been held responsible for sexual transgressions were very limited. 
By the twentieth century, the imagery of sex, violence, and authority had 
become hopelessly entangled.  Almost a century after the Whitechapel 
murders, a man named Peter Sutcliffe was tried and convicted of thirteen 
 
 89 PHILIP SUGDEN, THE COMPLETE HISTORY OF JACK THE RIPPER xxv, 259–60 (1994). 
 90 GRAY, supra note 75, at 42 (crediting the writer and philosopher Colin Wilson with the phrase and 
noting that Jane Caputi borrowed it for the title of her feminist text, The Age of Sex Crime). 
 91 See, e.g., id. at 45 (“The victims . . . were constructed even by the radical press as deserving their  
fate . . . .”). 
 92 CHAPLIN, supra note 64, at 35. 
 93 Id. 
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murders and seven assaults; all of his victims were women.94  The opposing 
narratives—“depraved-heart criminal murders innocent lamb” and, 
alternatively, “reputable and reasonable man kills seductive, fallen female”—
were already in place, along with the linguistic accoutrements.  But the 
evidence in the Sutcliffe case did not easily conform to either plotline.  The 
language used by investigators, as well as the popular press, shows how the 
“depraved heart” of guilty killers became confused and intermingled with the 
purportedly innocent, reasonable states of mind possessed by “reputable” men 
caught up in taboo sexual activity when the two types of conduct overlapped.95  
The confusion appears to be due at least in part to society’s inclination to 
condemn women for any sexual conduct, even while finding abhorrent the 
murderous actions of men.96 
Despite efforts to untangle the mixed messages and to substitute the leaner, 
minimalist language of science and modern news reports, the ambiguity 
signaled in Sutcliffe is still present in women’s interactions with the criminal 
justice system.  The urge to pardon a man’s loss of control when sexual 
relations are involved was long ago institutionalized in the “heat of passion” 
defense, which could reduce murder to manslaughter.  When allegations 
involve murder of one’s adulterous spouse or her paramour, a claim of 
uncontrollable rage in the face of such infidelity was deemed an exceptional 
circumstance justifying less punishment.97  State v. Thornton,98 cited by 
Professor Duncan, is typical.  As the appellate court, modifying and remanding 
the first-degree murder conviction, said in that case: 
[T]he encountering by a spouse of the situation which occurred here 
has been held, as a matter of law, to constitute sufficient provocation 
to reduce a charge of homicide from one of the degrees of murder to 
manslaughter absent actual malice, such as a previous grudge, 
revenge, or the like.99 
Actual malice—with its emblematic image of a depraved heart—is thus 
distinguishable from a reasonable response to provocation of the type that 
incites passion. 
 
 94 GRAY, supra note 75, at 63. 
 95 Id. at 64 (attributing investigative errors in the Sutcliffe case to investigators’ inability to see the 
murderer as “a product of patriarchal culture rather than as a freak of nature”). 
 96 See id. at 62–63, 73. 
 97 CLIFTON D. BRYANT, HANDBOOK OF DEATH & DYING 970 (2003). 
 98 730 S.W.2d 309 (Tenn. 1987) (cited by Duncan, supra note 1, at 1217). 
 99 Id. at 309. 
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While the language in the cases seems to camouflage gender-based 
viewpoints, less expressive language does not necessarily advance a women’s 
perspective any more definitively.  A recent case involving the abuse of 
women inmates is illustrative.  It can be argued that nowhere is the intersection 
of authority and violence more potent than in the correctional system.  Indeed, 
in this setting, authority may be a mask for violence.  The added element of 
female sexuality creates perfect storm conditions.  The following excerpt from 
Neal v. Michigan Department of Corrections,100 expressed in what Professor 
Duncan calls “steno-language,”101 is one court’s attempt to describe the 
situation: 
The case arises out of allegations that male corrections personnel 
have systematically engaged in a pattern of sexual harassment of 
female inmates incarcerated by the MDOC.  Specifically, plaintiffs’ 
complaint alleged that the MDOC assigns male officers to the 
housing units at all women’s facilities without providing any training 
related to cross-gender supervision; that women are forced to dress, 
undress, and perform basic hygiene and body functions in the open 
with male officers observing; that defendants allow male officers to 
observe during gynecological and other intimate medical care; that 
defendants require male officers to perform body searches of women 
prisoners that include pat-downs of their breasts and genital areas; 
that women prisoners are routinely subjected to offensive sex-based 
sexual harassment, offensive touching, and requests for sexual acts 
by male officers; and that there is a pattern of male officers 
requesting sexual acts from women prisoners as a condition of 
retaining good-time credits, work details, and educational and 
rehabilitative program opportunities.102 
The court’s description is almost devoid of imagery, possibly because there is 
no familiar story that the court could allude to.  Yet this clinical recitation is 
itself a “mystifying cloud,” almost completely hiding this single empirical, 
quantitative fact: “This action involves over five hundred plaintiffs . . . .”103  
While the court imposes liability, the language fails to convey any real shift in 
perspective.  The removal of the colorful verbiage does not change the 
underlying or continuing confusion about causation and fault. 
 
 100 Neal v. Dep’t of Corr., 592 N.W.2d. 370 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998). 
 101 Duncan, supra note 1, at 1238 n.229 (“Steno-language refers to utterances that have a ‘fixed set of 
associations,’ the same in every context.” (quoting WHEELWRIGHT, supra note 43, at 50)). 
 102 Neal, 592 N.W.2d at 372. 
 103 Neal v. Dep’t of Corr., 2009 WL 187813, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2009) (per curiam). 
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2. Heat of Passion: Fire 
The heat of passion defense, with its associated language of “cooling off,” 
“rekindling,” and, eventually “extreme emotional disturbance,”104 derives from 
the earlier language of depraved hearts and lost reason.  Historically, the 
concept flows from the ideal of the passionless woman, an ideal that arose 
from the need to protect the rational man from a Circean allure.105  The logic 
goes something like this: If it is assumed that man is rational and violent crime 
is irrational, then the normal, rational man will not commit such crimes; only 
the exceptional, irrational man will do so.  But the rational man cannot be 
expected to be immune to all sexual overtures or to remain calm in the face of 
assaults on his masculine identity.  What happens, then, if a man acts rationally 
in responding to sexual inducement and then turns to violence?  To hold men 
blameless, or at least find them to be sympathetic when sexual conduct was 
involved, the public had to look elsewhere to assign fault. 
An underlying difficulty here is that women have been historically 
problematic legal subjects.  A married woman’s legal identity merged into that 
of her husband, but commercial interests required that unmarried women be 
recognized as individuals in the market place.106  A single woman, with her 
future status in constant doubt since she could marry and lose her individual 
identity, could not be reliably viewed as an independent agent.107  The social 
culture pushed to remove the uncertain status, treating a woman’s unfettered 
sexuality as teeming with risk.  Thus, one solution to the dilemma was to 
conclude that because a “fallen” woman naturally incites even a rational man’s 
passion, only passionless women deserve sympathy.108  It also follows that any 
woman of “passion” can be presumed to be “fallen.”  According to Karen 
Halttunen, the ultimate “sexualization of the female murder victim” in print 
and in the public imagination thus “rested, ironically, on the passionless female 
ideal.”109  The image of the fallen woman had no early American counterpart, 
 
 104 See supra notes 11–14 and accompanying text. 
 105 HALTTUNEN, supra note 65, at 183 (“The sexualization of the female murder victim rested, ironically, 
on the passionless female ideal.”). 
 106 CHAPLIN, supra note 64, at 35. 
 107 Id. at 146. 
 108 See, e.g., HALTTUNEN, supra note 65, at 210 (noting in discussion of prostitute Helen Jewett’s murder 
that despite expressions of sympathy in the press, accounts “clearly suggested that Jewett’s death was 
ultimately deserved”). 
 109 Id. at 183 (emphasis added). 
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yet it became fixed as the opposite of a sexless woman who would not provoke 
a man’s passions with her own.110 
Again, linguistic shifts and developments reflecting these ideas played out 
in the law itself.  In the nineteenth century, the young Henry Leander Foote 
wrote an account of his life, including his murder of his cousin Emily 
Cooper.111  Foote killed his cousin following a trip to New York City during 
which he consorted with prostitutes.112  He claimed that obsessive thoughts 
about his sexual experiences in the city motivated the homicide: “But with 
shame! shame! do I write it, I now proceeded to examine her [Cooper’s] 
person, which inflamed my baser passion to an unmanageable degree; and after 
my eyes were satisfied, I violated and robbed her of her virgin purity.”  Then, 
“held ‘entirely in the power of Satan,’ he slit her throat.”113  Early connections 
between notions of a culpable “depraved heart” and the rational man’s 
understandable departure from reason due to the instigations of “fallen 
women” can be seen in Foote’s account of his crime.  The contrast of hard 
factual detail and soft imagery is also apparent. 
In the twentieth century, examples abound of murderous conduct defended 
by reference to passionate, fallen, unworthy women.  A 1930 Tennessee case 
relied on by the Thornton court, which involved the murder of the defendant’s 
wife’s paramour, is illustrative.  The appellate court noted: 
[I]f as a matter of fact, the deceased had debauched the wife of 
plaintiff in error, and the plaintiff in error had been apprised of that 
fact and had become convinced of its truth . . . and, with reasonable 
expedition, while under the influence of passion and agitation 
produced by such information, had killed [the paramour], he would 
only have been guilty of voluntary manslaughter.114 
By the time this case was decided, the story of the cuckolded husband was 
familiar and required only a slight reference to the “influence of passion.” 
The language of passion run amok was often intertwined with racial 
implications.  One example is the case in which Session Boyd, a black man, 
 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. at 203. 
 112 Id. at 205. 
 113 Id. (quoting from HENRY LEANDER FOOTE, A SKETCH OF THE LIFE AND ADVENTURES OF HENRY 
LEANDER FOOTE (1850)).  
 114 Davis v. State, 28 S.W.2d 993, 996 (Tenn. 1930). 
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was tried for the murder of a white woman with whom he had an affair.115  
Boyd’s wife (also a white woman) was reputed to be “a hooker,” and Boyd, 
according to expert psychiatric testimony, was “predisposed” to act 
irrationally.116  The victim was alleged to have acted provocatively, instigating 
“gossip and rumors” about the Boyd’s wife, including accusations that she was 
a “truck stop girl” and planned to leave Boyd and move in with another black 
man.117  The commingling of two familiar stories—the white trash hooker and 
the primitive black man—perpetuated stereotypes that need no further 
explanation. 
A few years after Boyd, a federal court in New York struggled to adapt the 
language of passion to changing sensibilities in the case of Grant v. 
Dalsheim.118  The defendant had been convicted of manslaughter for killing his 
wife’s lover.119  Not inclined to excuse the defendant’s behavior as readily as 
some earlier courts might have done, the court was nevertheless mindful of the 
still prevailing image of the prudent husband incensed and driven to irrational 
behavior.  Denying the defendant’s request that his conviction be overturned 
because of prejudicial remarks by the prosecution, the court noted: 
The prosecutor’s remarks must be considered in context . . . .  A 
review of the prosecutor’s summation indicates that it was in 
response to a highly emotional plea on behalf of petitioner based 
upon finding his wife in flagrante delicto.  The prosecutor was 
justified in using robust argument in response to avoid the 
substitution of sympathy for reasoned consideration of the evidence 
offered to sustain the indictment charge.  The prosecution had the 
right to ward off the emotional appeal and to remind the jurors that 
no matter how enraged the petitioner may have been because he 
found his wife in bed with another man, he had no right to kill him—
that they were to decide the case upon the evidence and the 
applicable law.120 
Even as the court sought to downplay the element of passion in defining the 
jury’s role, it employed the kind of loaded language that might encourage a 
“substitution of sympathy for reasoned consideration of the evidence.”  Words 
and phrases like “highly emotional,” “robust argument,” “ward off 
 
 115 Boyd v. State, 389 A.2d 1282 (Del. 1978). 
 116 Id. at 1284–86. 
 117 Id. at 1284. 
 118 Grant v. Dalsheim, 535 F. Supp. 1382 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
 119 Id. at 1384. 
 120 Id. at 1385. 
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[emotions],” and “enraged” suggest that more is at issue than a detached, 
logical assessment of evidence. 
The language of fire and passion persists despite legislative attempts to 
modify it by—most notably, as Professor Duncan points out—turning the “heat 
of passion” defense into the more generic “extreme emotional disturbance” 
defense.121  Certainly in cases complicated by the unresolved conflict of a 
presumptively rational man faced with a woman who audaciously incites his 
sexual passions, courts cling to the passionless woman ideal and the 
accompanying language of fire.  Thus, for example, in a 1999 case in which 
the defense of extreme emotional disturbance was invoked by a man who had 
killed one prostitute and had attempted to kill another,122 the court’s 
instructions to the jury included the following language: “While the emotional 
disturbance need not necessarily have been a spontaneous or sudden 
occurrence or caused by any particular provoking event, indeed [it] may have 
simmered in the defendant’s mind for [a] long period of time, the disturbance 
must actually have influenced his conduct at the time of the killing.”123  While 
courts and legislatures may be moving away from the old metaphors of fire and 
flame, heat and cold, the ideas surrounding men and women that in many ways 
helped formulate this language linger, keeping the language alive. 
3. Attempt: Journey 
Not surprisingly, the fire metaphor at times overlaps with images of hell, 
damnation, and salvation.  Closely connected to these images are themes of 
place and time and references to the transition from dark to light (or light to 
dark).  In criminal law, these themes and images are perhaps most developed in 
relation to the crime of attempt and the justification of self-defense. 
A key phrase in the law of attempt that Professor Duncan highlights is 
locus poenitentiae, the place where salvation happens.124  Because criminal 
acts follow a trajectory from conception to completion, it is possible to think of 
a criminal act as a kind of journey and of the actor as one en route to a bad end.  
The road to salvation can be interrupted by seduction, but, conversely, a person 
on the road to damnation can make a turn toward grace.  Thus, as Professor 
 
 121 Duncan, supra note 1, at 1206. 
 122 State v. Kaddah, 736 A.2d 902 (Conn. 1999). 
 123 Id. at 911 (emphasis added) (quoting the trial court’s instructions to the jury on extreme emotional 
disturbance).  
 124 Duncan, supra note 1, at 1222. 
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Duncan suggests, the convict, like the sinner—or as a sinner—always has the 
potential to be saved.125 
The idea of salvation is embedded in the American system of punishment, 
demonstrated by the historical emphasis on saving the soul right up to the point 
of execution.126  The pursuit of salvation was a motivating factor in the 
establishment of U.S. prisons, and punishment has always been accompanied 
by spiritual advice.127  According to the doctrine of the atonement, an idea 
subscribed to by early English settlers, “a repentant murderer enjoyed the same 
access to free grace as any other sinner.”128 
Halttunen relates the story of Esther Rodgers, an American tale of the 
spiritual journey to salvation.  Rodgers was born in Maine in 1680.129  She was 
apprenticed at the age of thirteen and, at seventeen, “committed her first 
murder, stopping the breath of her newborn child, the fruit of an illicit liaison 
with a Negro serving in the same household.”130  The crime, however, went 
undetected until a few years later, when Rodgers again gave birth and then 
buried the (possibly stillborn) infant.131  Upon discovery of the infant’s body, 
Rodgers was prosecuted, and she then confessed to the earlier homicide.132 
In 1701, John Rogers, a preacher, published Esther Rodgers’s confession, 
along with three “execution sermon[s]” he made on Esther Rodgers’s behalf 
before her execution, in a booklet entitled Death the Certain Wages of Sin of 
the Impenitent.133  In it, Reverend Rogers focuses on “the spiritual pilgrimage 
of Esther Rodgers as she moved from a state of religious indifference to 
overwhelming conviction of sin to a strong hope, as her execution drew near, 
in her salvation.”134  Halttunen highlights that, according to John Rogers, 
Esther Rodgers was “[o]nce an irreligious, unchaste woman willing to destroy 
her own child to conceal her vicious conduct, [but] had been spiritually 
transformed during her eight months of bondage, and had emerged from prison 
 
 125 See id. 
 126 See HALTTUNEN, supra note 65, at 20 (noting that the practice of reading a criminal’s confessions 
aloud was “a central part of execution ritual”). 
 127 Nancy L. Cook, The Sky in a Box: Reflections on Prisons, Preachers, Storytelling and Salvation, 3 
FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 135, 140 (2002) (discussing the religious foundations of American prisons). 
 128 HALTTUNEN, supra note 65, at 20. 
 129 Id. at 7. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. at 7–8. 
 134 Id. at 8. 
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‘Sprinkled, Cleansed, Comforted, a Candidate of Heaven.’”135  The idea of 
opportunity for grace is carried over in Rogers’s exhortation to the public who 
witnessed Esther Rodgers’s execution.  “This Serves only to draw the Curtain,” 
he said, “that thou mayst behold a Tragick Scene, strangely changed into a 
Theater of Mercy.”136 
While the possibility of finding a path to salvation was believed to exist up 
until the moment of death, there was the countervailing possibility of falling 
from a righteous path at any moment.  And historically, crime narratives have 
reflected this belief with regard to the potential for temptation, seduction, or 
falling from the path to heaven.  With respect to women, one such narrative 
aligns feminine beauty with weakness; weakness leads to sin and therefore 
justifies men’s authority over women.  This same beauty can be deceptive, 
disorienting the male observer with “‘confused, uncertain images’ which are 
the hallmark of the ‘grander passions.’”137  The idea of the female body as a 
“deceitful maze”138 places women in the role of entrapper or seducer—the 
Medusa with her “tempestuous loveliness of terror.”139  Following this logic, in 
the nineteenth century, medical experts tried to show connections among 
prostitution, crime, and insanity.  For example, after visiting Parisian 
prostitution circles, prisons, asylums, and hospitals, Dr. Augustus Kinsley 
Gardner, an averred specialist in both obstetrics and insanity, reported his 
findings on the relationship between female sexuality and insanity and the 
impact of these variables on criminal deviance.140 
These attitudes have also been expressed in crime narratives.  In the 1936 
case of Helen Jewett’s murder, reports of the young woman’s demise “by the 
hatchet of the midnight assassin[] and the flame of the incendiary”141 present 
 
 135 Id. (quoting John Rogers, Jr., The Declaration and Confession of Esther Rodgers, 1701, in THE 
ENGLISH LITERATURES OF AMERICA, 1500–1800, at 404, 404 (Myra Jehlen & Michael Warner eds., 1997)).  
The Declaration and Confession of Esther Rodgers originally was published as part of Death and Certain 
Wages of Sin of the Impenitent.  THE ENGLISH LITERATURES OF AMERICA, 1500–1800, supra at 404. 
 136 John Rogers, Jr., supra note 135, at 404 (emphasis added). 
 137 CHAPLIN, supra note 64, at 20 (quoting EDMUND BURKE, A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY INTO THE ORIGIN 
OF OUR IDEAS OF THE SUBLIME AND THE BEAUTIFUL 79 (Harper & Brother Publishers 1860) (1757)). 
 138 Id. (quoting BURKE, supra note 137, at 145). 
 139 Percy Bysshe Shelley, On the Medusa of Leonardo da Vinci in the Florentine Gallery, in 1 POEMS FOR 
THE MILLENNIUM l, 32 (Jerome Rothenberg & Jeffrey C. Robinson eds., 2009). 
 140 G.J. BARKER-BENFIELD, THE HORRORS OF THE HALF-KNOWN LIFE: MALE ATTITUDES TOWARD 
WOMEN AND SEXUALITY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 83 (1976). 
 141 HALTTUNEN, supra note 65, at 201 (quoting THE LIFE OF ELLEN JEWETT; ILLUSTRATIVE OF HER 
ADVENTURES WITH VERY IMPORTANT INCIDENTS, FROM HER SEDUCTION TO THE PERIOD OF HER MURDER, 
TOGETHER WITH VARIOUS EXTRACTS FROM HER JOURNAL, CORRESPONDENCE, AND POETICAL EFFUSIONS 45 
(New York 1836)).  The Life of Ellen Jewett is one of several pamphlets that was published around the time of 
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the chronology as a logical progression from a move into a brothel to a tragic 
end.  It was not the perpetrator’s situation that caught the public’s attention but 
the victim’s journey from innocence to sin to a fiery end—described in the 
intertwined language of sex and violence.  Karen Halttunen explains: 
That envious working girl had failed to see “the future picture of the 
burnt and blackened body, and the ghastly gashes in the brain, which 
were to be the epilogue of the fine show and false delight.”  When 
popular accounts described Jewett “with her transparent forehead half 
divided with a butcher’s stroke, and her silver skin burnt to a cinder 
where it was not laced with blood . . .” they suggested that [her] death 
was the inevitable result of her sexual fall.142 
Henry Leander Foote’s similar accounts of his own crimes portrayed 
prostitutes as the activating agents.143  As discussed, Foote not only raped and 
killed his cousin following an episodic consortium with prostitutes; he also 
killed his mother when she took away the liquor he had begun to imbibe 
freely.144  In his account, Foote blamed liquor, prostitutes, and “licentious 
novels” for his conduct.145  Specifically with regard to the prostitutes, he 
reproved “those fine looking women” who “array themselves in the most gay 
costume, adorn their persons with pearls, rings, paint, and jewels, and perfume 
themselves till they smell as sweet as an oriental garden to enchant and 
bewitch young men.”146  Having been “enticed” by the “snares, arts, and 
devices of the harlot,” he was not in control.147 
By the mid-twentieth century, the distinctions between the rational man 
unwittingly seduced and the cold-hearted man with a depraved heart and 
between the virginal, passionless woman and the fiery seductress were 
routinely woven into the analysis of crimes that crossed gender lines.  These 
distinctions are drawn in the Sutcliffe murder case, which involved multiple 
victims.148  Investigators sorted out relatively “deserving” victims from the 
 
Helen Jewett’s murder and refers to Helen Jewett as Ellen Jewett.  See Patricia Cline Cohen, The Helen Jewett 
Murder: Violence, Gender, and Sexual Licentiousness in Antebellum America, 2 NWSA J. 374, 380–82 
(1990).  (Due to the limited availability of the pamphlet, the page numbers are taken from secondary sources.). 
 142 Id. (quoting GEORGE WILKES & H.R. HOWARD, THE LIVES OF HELEN JEWETT AND RICHARD P. 
ROBINSON 40, 119 (T.B. Peterson 1849) [hereinafter THE LIVES OF JEWETT AND ROBINSON]). 
 143 Id. at 203–05. 
 144 Id. at 205. 
 145 Id. at 204 (quoting FOOTE, supra note 113, at 35) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 146 Id. at 204 (quoting FOOTE, supra note 113, at 35–37) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 147 Id. at 206 (quoting FOOTE, supra note 113, at 39–43) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 148 GRAY, supra note 75, at 63. 
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“innocent” based on the linguistic doublethink of whore/victim.149  The chief 
investigator in the case picked up on Sutcliffe’s judgments about his victims: 
that by walking alone at night, walking slowly, or making gestures that could 
be interpreted as being provocative, Sutcliffe’s victims triggered a kind of 
“insane” response from him.150  The police were put on the defensive by 
Sutcliffe’s twisted assertions of victim fault, prompting assurances at a press 
conference that they intended to “continue to arrest prostitutes” and were 
concerned about the possibility that “innocent girls” were being targeted.151 
Throughout history, a thread of mitigation has run through criminal law 
discourse that suggests a reduced culpability on the part of the perpetrator 
when crime was triggered by sexual temptation.  Sir Robert Anderson, lead 
investigator in the “Jack the Ripper” case, writes in his memoir, The Lighter 
Side of My Official Life, that warning prostitutes off the streets brought an end 
to the deadly crime spree of the never-found murderer, thus implying that the 
women’s conduct had been the main source of the problem.152  At the same 
time, there are suggestions in criminal law literature that the women, rather 
than the perpetrators, can find redemption.  Even Harriet Vane, the talented, 
independent protagonist of Dorothy Sayers’s detective novels, can be viewed 
as a woman who has found her way when at last she marries.  In the eyes of 
many readers, says Frances Gray, “[Vane’s] marriage to Peter Wimsey 
redeems her past.”153 
4. The Castle Doctrine: Feudal Past 
Some of criminal law’s historical connections go back much further than 
the Enlightenment or Victorian times: The law of self-defense, like the law of 
attempt, hearkens back to the feudal era in England.  By its very appellation, 
the castle doctrine of self-defense evokes the history and social culture of 
medieval times.  The castle doctrine is framed in much the same way as the 
heat-of-passion exemption: a justifiable response to an unendurable affront.  
The language associated with claims of right (in the case of self-defense) and 
claims of mitigation (in cases of attempt and heat of passion) suggests 
 
 149 Id. at 72–73. 
 150 Id. at 73. 
 151 Id. at 73 (quoting an October 1979 newspaper article from the Evening News). 
 152 Id. at 45 (citing SIR ROBERT ANDERSON, THE LIGHTER SIDE OF MY OFFICIAL LIFE 197 (1994)). 
 153 Id. at 29. 
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necessity, inevitability, and timelessness.154  And in cases where women are 
implicated as criminal actors, victims, or essential third parties, this language 
reflects the refinements of social judgments about the men and women 
involved. 
The eloquent phrases defining self-defense and attempt fittingly reflect the 
paradoxes in law and society.  The castle conjures up images of knights in 
armor, battlements, the defense of property, and assertions of right and might.  
Within this world, women were property, part of the owned estate.155  There 
were exceptions to this principle; unmarried women (and even married women 
in some circumstances) could own property in their own right.156  For the 
general principle that women were property to hold true, two accommodations 
were made: married women who owned property were treated in law, though 
not in reality, as femmes sole; and unmarried women were treated as not-yet-
married women.157  This conception preserved the identity of men as kings of 
the castle.  It also marginalized independent women, putting social interactions 
with them or their oft-presumed equivalents, “fallen women,” on a different 
footing. 
One manifestation of the friction between woman-as-property and woman-
as-property-owner can be seen in the evolution of the discourse surrounding 
the crime of rape.  Rape was for many centuries considered a crime against 
property—a man’s property.158  Consensual sex between a woman and a man 
who was not her husband meant the ruination of the woman’s future, and 
consent was presumed in the absence of clearly expressed resistance.159  A 
woman could exercise free will by consenting to or refusing sexual relations, 
but these actions were not on her own behalf.160  And once she, as “property,” 
 
 154 The appellation comes from the adage, “A man’s home is his castle.”  As Joel Prentiss Bishop 
explained in “Defence of the Castle” in his 1877 criminal treatise, “it may now be deemed to be reasonably 
clear, that, to prevent an unlawful entrance into the dwelling-house, the occupant may make defense to the 
taking of life, without being liable for even manslaughter.”  2 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
CRIMINAL LAW § 707, at 393 (6th ed. 1877); see also Nancy L. Cook, In Celia’s Defense: Transforming the 
Story of Property Acquisition in Sexual Harassment Cases into a Feminist Castle Doctrine, 6 VA. J. SOC. POL. 
& L. 197, 287 (1999). 
 155 Cook, supra note 154, at 247–48 (discussing the history of the legal concept of women as property). 
 156 See CHAPLIN, supra note 64, at 145–46 (discussing the legal treatment of women property owners). 
 157 Id. 
 158 GRAY, supra note 75, at 85. 
 159 See id. (“Under the Deuteronomic code, a betrothed woman discovered having sex with another man 
in the town could be executed on the grounds that her transgression was voluntary ‘because she did not cry for 
help.’”). 
 160 Id. 
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was “damaged” and rendered worthless, there was nothing to be done but 
destroy or discard her, a fate imposed even on those identified as “innocents” 
and “true” victims.161  Even literature seemed unable to find any other way to 
rectify the contradictions while preserving men’s dominant status. 
Within these narratives are the images of darkness and light.  The castle is 
not only associated with royalty, Arthurian romance, and power but also with 
the cold and dark of stone walls, dungeons, secret passages, intrigue, and 
horror.162  Reason, that central characteristic of the “Enlightenment” man, 
represents a quest for light.163  Blackstone, who compares law to a Gothic 
castle, sees more in the symbolism than awe-inspiring authority; he also sees 
mystery, the timeless void of human origins—a wild, shadowy nature to be 
tamed.164  The mission of the rational man is to exercise control over nature.  
But the dark side of nature is always threatening, and one potential source of 
the darkness is the female of the species. 
The rational man’s defense to murder reveals this mindset.  One 
explanation for Peter Sutcliffe’s murderous spree was his claim that the first 
murder was provoked by a prostitute’s taunt regarding his sexual 
inadequacy.165  Sutcliffe’s inability to assume a proper role in relation to a 
woman of dark passions created a “cocktail of frustration, guilt and 
humiliation” that understandably, according to press reports, “could lead to 
fury.”166  Reports of Richard Robinson’s murder of Helen Jewett in a New 
York City brothel also suggest a rational response to the deep, dark threats 
within and outside the castle walls.  Further, they suggest that Jewett’s death 
was ultimately deserved.  Discussing that case, one commentator described 
prostitutes as “a troop of gaudy poisoners, teeming with disease,” allowed to 
“stream through the street, carrying death beneath their skirts.”167  Thus, a 
 
 161 See, e.g., Judy M. Cornett, The Treachery of Perception: Evidence and Experience in Clarissa, 63 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 165, 177 n.79 (1994) (describing the plot of Samuel Richardson’s novel Clarissa, in which the 
protagonist “eventually withers away and dies” after being raped); WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE RAPE OF 
LUCRECE ll. 1700–16 (where Lucrece, the victim of a rape, commits suicide); WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, TITUS 
ANDRONICUS act 5, sc. 3 (where Titus kills his own daughter, Lavinia, to protect her from the shame of living 
as a rape victim). 
 162 CHAPLIN, supra note 64, at 127–28. 
 163 See id. at 24 (discussing the idea that, according to Hobbes, man’s “being in the dark” creates anxiety 
that motivates a desire for knowledge, i.e., “enlightenment”). 
 164 Id. at 27 (citing WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *33). 
 165 GRAY, supra note 75, at 67–68. 
 166 Id. at 68 (quoting a London Observer article published May 7, 1981). 
 167 HALTTUNEN, supra note 65, at 201 (quoting THE LIVES OF JEWETT AND ROBINSON, supra note 142, at 
79) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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woman like Helen Jewett, who would “entice the wayfarer with her 
blandishments, and willfully and basely light a fire in his bones . . . should be 
treated as a murderess.”168  The rational man’s death blow to such a woman 
could be construed, “like the slaying of Medusa, as an act of just retribution 
and collective male self-defense.”169  A New York Herald story similarly 
employed blame-shifting language: “How could a young man perpetrate so 
brutal an act?  Is it not more like the work of a woman?  Are not the whole 
train of circumstances within the ingenuity of a female, abandoned and 
desperate?”170  Incorporating the imagery of fire and pestilence, ancient Greek 
wisdom, and the innocent wayfarer, these stories imply an undeniable and 
inevitable conclusion that the male perpetrator’s conduct was justified. 
As white western women sought more independence, and the law granted 
them more legal rights and privileges, the story language that had been 
developing in criminal justice continued to have significant impact on their 
fates.  A highly publicized case in England in the early 1920s involved Edith 
Thompson, who was hanged as an accomplice (along with her paramour, the 
actual killer) for the murder of her husband.171  Thompson’s case illustrates the 
continuing uncertainty of the place of women in western culture, even as the 
law was evolving.  Thompson was steeped in romantic tradition, a fact 
reflected in letters she wrote to her lover, which were filled with references to 
romantic novels and the trappings of a freethinking society.172  While she 
describes herself as behaving in the detached and passionless manner expected 
of women—at the Waldorf, waiting to have tea, wearing a black frock—she 
nevertheless situates herself as a modern, independent woman, free to flirt and 
enjoy life’s adventures.173  She thereby puts herself outside the castle’s 
protection.  The circumstantial evidence of her complicity in her husband’s 
murder relied on the narrative model of a romantic Victorian-turned-
independent woman unredeemed.  Ultimately, in the public eye, she seemed to 
 
 168 Id. at 201 (quoting THE LIVES OF JEWETT AND ROBINSON, supra note 142, at 79) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 169 Id. 
 170 Id. at 202 (citing DANIEL A. COHEN, PILLARS OF SALT, MONUMENTS OF GRACE: NEW ENGLAND CRIME 
LITERATURE AND THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN POPULAR CULTURE 1674–1860, at 21 (1993) (quoting a New 
York Herald article published April 14, 1836)). 
 171 GRAY, supra note 75, at 20. 
 172 Id. 
 173 Id. 
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become the castle’s ghost, neither evil woman of passion nor cool hostess of 
virtue.174 
Recent events highlight how these historical patterns have had dire 
consequences for women in modern times.  For example, in 1994, female 
inmates of Michigan’s prisons brought suit in federal court alleging civil rights 
violations through multiple acts of physical abuse and sexual harassment.  
Newspaper reports of the trial noted that “[t]he women’s stories were different, 
and yet the same.”175  Most of the women said they had not reported the 
abuse.176  “There was no point, they testified,” because nothing would be 
done.177  Moreover, there was great risk, according to the women’s testimony, 
because “officers could and did retaliate with tickets for misconduct that could 
put them in isolation, and cost them access to their education, visitation, and 
even their release.”178  In this narrative are echoes of the impregnable castle, 
fortified and controlled by the men who own it.  Press coverage of the case 
repeatedly described the prison environment as one in which a “culture of 
impunity” reigned.179  “Culture of impunity,” a term often associated with 
torture and genocide, is perhaps part of the new millennium’s beautiful 
language, a late-century model of darkness, dungeons, and unrestrained 
natures.  It suggests, in this context, that the guards and prison officials who 
engaged in rape, sexual assault, intimidation, and other forms of abuse against 
female inmates acted with a “depraved heart,” but without fear of punishment.  
Thus, the evocative poetic language of the criminal law is transformed and 
comes full circle. 
C. Professor Duncan’s Linguistic Theory in Context 
Professor Duncan’s analysis of why courts might choose to lean on the 
poetic language of criminal law readily applies in the context of women in the 
criminal justice system.  Participants in the system use the language she quotes 
in this context as much as, if not more often than, in other contexts as a way of 
evading precise definition.  The evocative power of language is particularly 
 
 174 Id. at 24 (describing Edith Thompson as a “silenced object to be looked at”—both a “spectacle to 
incite compassion” and an “unclean” woman threatening social stability). 
 175 Susan L. Oppat, Prison Guard Abuse Lawsuit Goes to Jury, ANN ARBOR NEWS, Jan. 31, 2008, 
available at http://blog.mlive.com/annarbornews/2008/01/prison_guard_abuse_lawsuit_goe.html. 
 176 Id. 
 177 Id. 
 178 Id. 
 179 Eric D. Campbell, Women Prisoners’ Lawsuit Addresses MDOC Abuse, MICH. CITIZEN, Sept. 25, 
2009 (quoting U.S. Human Rights Watch director David Fahti). 
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evident when matters of gender are implicitly at issue.  Historical associations 
also can be easily seen; indeed, where women are concerned, allusions to 
cultural markers might be viewed as a well-oiled slope to preserve historical, 
gender-based rights and privileges. 
1. Evasion of Precise Definition 
One reason frequently given as to why the language of criminal law stories, 
in case law and elsewhere, tends to be vague, impressionistic, or imprecise is 
that the subject matter of mystery and horror does not lend itself to easy 
description.  Writing about the difficulty in conveying a story of death, because 
its discovery that comes only in sensory perceptions, Virginia Woolf asserts, 
“[W]e cannot possibly break out of the frame of the picture by speaking natural 
words.”180  This reasoning has been used over time to account for writers’ and 
tellers’ inability to articulate with any exactitude the events, causes, and 
consequences of serious violence.  “Language is incapable of giving utterance 
to the feelings that shock the soul as its horrors and enormities are brought 
before us,” states one nineteenth-century author.181  In part, says Karen 
Halttunen, this belief has been “[s]haped by the . . . dominance of legal 
narrative, [wherein] murder remains a ‘mystery,’ fragmentary and open-ended, 
resistant to full moral closure.”182  Halttunen herself accepts this perspective, 
observing: 
True-crime literature is engaged in an endless exploration of a 
question to which we have no satisfying answer.  All it can do is to 
repeat over and over again, with each horrifying revelation of some 
new case, that murder is fundamentally a mystery—resistant to full 
knowledge and moral comprehension—and a horror—unspeakable, 
unimaginable, inexplicable.183 
In order to convey what is understood to be true, the reporter requires “a 
language beyond the literal.”184 
This may be one explanation for the imprecision of language in criminal 
law, but it is likely that there are other reasons as well.  For instance, in many 
criminal matters, the ambiguous language may be used to hide our shame.  
 
 180 VIRGINIA WOOLF, Three Pictures, in DEATH OF THE MOTH AND OTHER ESSAYS 14 (1942). 
 181 HALTTUNEN, supra note 65, at 73 (quoting an unspecified mid-nineteenth-century popular murder 
anthology) (internal citation marks omitted). 
 182 Id. at 242. 
 183 Id. at 244. 
 184 GRAY, supra note 75, at 93. 
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Four different examples involving intimate relationships with women can be 
used to demonstrate how shame plays a role in transference, denial, avoidance, 
and self-deception, possibly accounting for some uncertain or unclear 
language: seventeenth-century law on infanticide; eighteenth-century defenses 
to charges of infanticide; conditions in women’s prisons in modern times; and 
investigative findings into conditions in modern women’s prisons. 
The idea of shame was explicit in the lexicon of English and early Anglo-
American law.  The preamble to a 1624 infanticide statute, which called for the 
execution of any mother of a dead infant in the absence of proof that the child 
had been born dead, is illustrative: “WHEREAS many lewd women that have 
been delivered of bastard children, to avoid their shame, and to escape 
punishment, do secretly bury or conceal the death of their children, and after, if 
the child be found dead, the said woman do allege, that the said child was born 
dead,” guilt was presumed and the ultimate punishment was required.185  
Applicable only to unmarried women, whose “lewd[ness]” was the family’s 
and the community’s shame, the situations to which the statute referred were 
often described in general terms.186  One account of a 1679 case, for example, 
reported that the accused, “consenting that she was never married,” had been 
convicted of “a crime in itself so horrible and unnatural, as one would think no 
person, especially of that sex, which is considered the most tender hearted and 
merciful, could be guilty of such an inhumane Impiety.”187  The crime referred 
to is infanticide—murder—even though the proof consisted only of evidence 
that the defendant delivered the child and did so without a witness present to 
attest to the child either not having been alive at birth or having died of natural 
causes.188  Here, shame is used as justification for criminalization and to 
silence those to whom the shame attaches.  Vague language ensures that a full 
delineation of events is not revealed. 
Within the next half century, women would use shame as a defense 
strategy.  If a woman could provide evidence of her own virtue and proof of 
seduction by an irrational man, she might convince a court that she “did it to 
hide Shame.”189  By cloaking herself in shame, and giving up a claim to fully 
 
 185 CHAPLIN, supra note 64, at 87–88 (citing the preamble to Statute of James I, 1634, c. 27, § 21 (Eng.)). 
 186 Id. at 88. 
 187 Id. (quoting PETER C. HOFFER & N.E.H. HULL, MURDERING MOTHERS: INFANTICIDE IN ENGLAND AND 
NEW ENGLAND 1558–1803, at 67 (1981)). 
 188 Id. 
 189 Id. at 89 (citing the case of Sarah Hayes, decided April 9, 1746, Proceedings of the Old Bailey); see 
also Sarah Hayes, Killing, The Proceedings of the Old Bailey—London’s Central Criminal Court, 1674–1913, 
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autonomous agency, an unmarried woman might preserve some measure of 
status or, at least, her life.190  The trade-off was that women would be regarded 
as “real objects of our greatest pity.”191  The “cause of this most horrid 
crime”—infanticide—was deemed to be “an excess of what is really a virtue, 
of the sense of shame, or modesty.”192  The language remains nebulous, but the 
veiled cause of the crime—shame—is now identified as a virtue rather than a 
vice. 
A more recent example, drawn from the reflections of women inmates on 
dysfunctional intimate relationships that contributed to their involvement in the 
criminal justice system, suggests women have internalized shame in 
connection with sexual identity, if not as a virtue, at least as an understood 
expectation.  In the late twentieth century, as in the mid-eighteenth century, 
this assumption of shame created conflicts for women caught up in the 
criminal justice system.  In strikingly clear terms, one inmate in the New York 
prison system explains it this way: 
A lot of women in here won’t be woman enough to say that they were 
abused by a man.  I want women to know that I was abused by a man 
and I’m doing time for a man, and that’s something I’m never going 
to do again once I’m released.  I’m not that proud; I was used by this 
man, I was abused by this man, and I went through enough.193 
It is not only the abused themselves who experience shame; even those who 
recognize and condemn acts of abuse employ language that hides the real 
experience.  The female Michigan inmates who filed the suit alleged that they 
were required to 
perform basic hygiene and body functions in the open with male 
officers observing; that defendants allow male officers to observe 
during gynecological and other intimate medical care. . . that women 
prisoners [were] routinely subjected to offensive sex-based sexual 
harassment, offensive touching, and requests for sexual acts by male 
officers; and that there [was] a pattern of male officers requesting 
sexual acts from women prisoners as a condition of retaining good-
 
http://www.oldbaileyonline.org/browse.jsp?id=t17460409-47-defend695&div=t17460409-47#highlight (last 
visited June 5, 2010). 
 190 See id. 
 191 Id. at 90 (citing THE LETTERS OF ERASMUS DARWIN 42 (Desmond King-Hele ed., 1981). 
 192 Id. (citation omitted). 
 193 PAULA C. JOHNSON, INNER LIVES: VOICES OF AFRICAN AMERICAN WOMEN IN PRISON 129 (2003) 
(discussing the story of Marilyn). 
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time credits, work details, and educational and rehabilitative program 
opportunities.194 
Having eliminated the coded language of passion and fire, writings that 
examine women and men in the criminal justice system now substitute a 
different coded language, one that is equally indefinite and vague. 
Legislatures, courts, and others in the criminal justice system have 
attempted to neutralize the language of criminal law, replacing, for example, 
“heat of passion” with “extreme emotional disturbance” and avoiding charged 
terminology.  But the result isn’t necessarily any different and may spring from 
the same motivation—a disinclination to confront the experience of shame.  In 
one case cited by Professor Duncan, the testimony an expert witness about the 
defendant’s state of mind and the court’s explanation of the applicable law are 
evasive to the point of being self-deceptive.195  The psychiatrist’s conclusions 
on the issue of extreme emotional disturbance were expressed: “Like as in any 
love, there is hate and with passive people there is more love on the surface 
than hate and this came out.  He was predisposed to his personality at times to 
overreact with repressed hostility.”196  The court, amplifying the confusion, 
charged the jury: 
There must be a reasonable explanation for the existence of the 
extreme emotional disturbance or distress.  It is not the person who 
must be reasonable at the time because a reasonable man would not 
intentionally kill another person; it is the frenzy of mind based upon a 
reasonable explanation which is basic to the jury’s determination.197 
Relying on the assumption that men are reasonable, and only a man far outside 
the norm or justly provoked would engage in such violence, the court’s 
language here raises a question of whether, in the circumstances of this case, 
those involved in the trial were unable to fit the facts into the presumptive 
norm.198 
 
 194 Neal v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 592 N.W.2d. 370, 372 (Mich. 1998) (emphasis added). 
 195 See Boyd v. State, 389 A.2d 1282, 1286 (Del. 1978).  Professor Duncan references Boyd in Duncan, 
supra note 1, at 1206.   
 196 Boyd, 389 A.2d at 1286. 
 197 Id. at 1288 (emphasis omitted). 
 198 The case came out of rural Delaware in 1978, and the defendant, a black man married to a white 
woman, had killed his white paramour.  Id. at 1282. 
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2. Power of Language 
Certainly, the criminal law’s language is as memorable, evocative, and 
associative with respect to women as it is in other contexts.  Romantic motifs 
and subliminal messages abound in this as in other forms of reportage.  As 
Toni Morrison writes: 
The symbolic language that emanates from unforeseen events 
supplies media with the raw material from which a narrative 
emerges—already scripted, fully spectacularized and  
riveting . . . .  Underneath the commodified story (of violence, sex, 
race, etc.) is a cultural one. . . .  The spectacle is the narrative; the 
narrative is spectacularized and both monopolize appearance and 
social reality.  Interested only in developing itself, the spectacle is 
immune to correction.199 
In some sense, the symbiosis between narrative and spectacle has always 
been part of the criminal justice system.  Professor Duncan elucidates 
historical differences in public manifestations of the relationship, specifically 
in the Romantic and overtly scientific Enlightenment eras.  She quotes 
historian and philosopher Richard Tarnas: “For the Romantic reality was 
symbolically resonant through and through, and was therefore fundamentally 
multivalent, a constantly changing complex of many-leveled meanings, even of 
opposites.  For the Enlightenment-scientific mind, in contrast, reality was 
concrete and literal, univocal.”200 The nineteenth century ushered in the 
practice of looking to cultural context for causational clues, leading to social 
and behavioral consequences of the sort Toni Morrison identifies.   As a 
“humanitarian revolution” took hold, the symbiosis changed in appearance, 
though not in its fundamental character.201  This nineteenth-century 
“humanitarian revolution in sensibility . . . introduced a whole range of new 
attitudes towards violence, pain, and death, [and] provided the necessary 
cultural context for sensationalist murder literature.”202  Evidence abounds that 
such notions apply to cases involving women in the criminal justice system.  A 
brief chronology that highlights the language used by prosecutors, defense 
attorneys, medical experts, the accused, the police, prison guards, and 
 
 199 Toni Morrison, Introduction to BIRTH OF A NATION’HOOD: GAZE, SCRIPT, AND SPECTACLE IN THE O.J. 
SIMPSON CASE xvi–xvii (Toni Morrison & Claudia Brodsky Lacour eds., 1997). 
 200 Duncan, supra note 1, at 1239 (quoting RICHARD TARNAS, THE PASSION OF THE WESTERN MIND 368 
(1991)). 
 201 See infra notes 202–205 and accompanying text. 
 202 HALTTUNEN, supra note 65, at 78. 
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oversight agents demonstrates how common and pervasive the use of 
evocative, allusive language is in this context. 
In the early part of the nineteenth century, the prosecutor in the case against 
James Eldredge, a man alleged to have poisoned pregnant Sarah Jane Gould 
because he had fallen in love with Gould’s sister,203 used a Biblical reference 
to persuade the jury of Eldredge’s guilt.204  He introduced the image of the 
serpent in the Biblical tale of the Garden of Eden, arguing that the defendant 
tempted the woman, and, like that “serpent of old,” brought her to shame and 
ruin.205  In another nineteenth-century case, the defense used the same analog, 
but this time it was to excuse the conduct of an accused murderer.  In the 
Richard Robinson case, in which the defendant was alleged to have murdered a 
prostitute, it was a woman, not the defendant, who was compared to the 
serpent.206  Robinson’s attorney similarly referenced the story of Adam and 
Eve in the Garden of Eden.207  He portrayed the prosecution’s chief witness, 
the owner of the brothel where the homicide occurred, as “corrupt and rotten,” 
“polluted,” and a “tender flower concealing the serpent that is beneath.”208  In 
these examples, the lawyers wove allusions and metaphors into their arguments 
to create spectacle in the court and promote the adoption of the related 
narrative in the public’s consciousness. 
During this same period, medical experts adopted the language of nature in 
their analyses of aberrant or deviant behavior.  The improper use of words, 
alleged to be an “abuse of words,” was itself deemed to be madness.209  Nearly 
all of woman’s biological ailments were said to originate in her reproductive 
organs—“the seat of her diseases.”210  Some physicians believed that 
menstruation was itself a form of disease, and others believed that sexual 
desire in a woman was a pathological condition.211  The “controlling 
 
 203 See supra notes 79–81 and accompanying text. 
 204 HALTTUNEN, supra note 65, at 179. 
 205 Id. at 179 (quoting THE TRIAL FOR MURDER OF JAMES E. ELDREDGE, supra note 80, at 118) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 206 Id. at 202. 
 207 Id. 
 208 Id. (quoting RICHARD P. ROBINSON ET AL., MURDER MOST FOUL!: A SYNOPSIS OF SPEECHES OF OGDEN 
HOFFMAN, THOMAS PHENIX, HUGH MAXWELL, JUDGE EDWARDS, & C. ON THE TRIAL OF ROBINSON, FOR THE 
MURDER OF ELLEN JEWETT (1836)). 
 209 CHAPLIN, supra note 64, at 25 (quoting THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 146 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 
1986) (1651)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 210 CARROLL SMITH-ROSENBERG, DISORDERLY CONDUCT: VISIONS OF GENDER IN VICTORIAN AMERICA 
183–84 (1985) (quoting JOHN WILTBANK, INTRODUCTORY LECTURE FOR THE SESSION 1853–54, at 7 (1854)). 
 211 Id. at 184. 
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influence” exerted upon a woman by her reproductive processes was believed 
to extend to her mental state.212  Hysteria, a “morbid state” in men, was 
deemed the “natural state” in women.213  Pregnancy, childbirth, lactation, and 
menstruation all placed women in the dangerous state of “temporary insanity” 
in which they were “more prone than men to commit any unusual or 
outrageous act.”214  Such ideas, dressed in the romantic language of nature and 
presented at trials in the form of expert testimony, were used as medical 
authority to advance the passionless ideal.215 
This reliance on evocative imagery persisted throughout the twentieth 
century.  Edith Thompson, whose trial for murder in Great Britain has been the 
subject of historical commentary and literature since its occurrence in 1922, 
subscribed to the narrative scripts of her time.  In letters written to her lover 
before her husband’s death, Thompson playfully relates stories in the coded 
language of the dominant criminal justice discourse.  In one, she describes an 
encounter with a man looking for a woman who called herself “Romance” with 
whom he had corresponded through the “Personal Column.”216  The romantic 
images of black lace and roses are notable in Thompson’s letter along with 
reference to the possibility that the man in search of “Romance” was “mad.”217  
Similarly, the public narrative that followed Thompson’s hanging “partook of 
the nature of spectacle”; rumors circulated about her going mad or 
miscarrying,218 and social commentators exploited her death to advocate 
against either the death penalty or the “flaccid sentimentality” of the anti-
capital punishment lobby.219 
The discourse of spectacle and evocation has become a part of everyday 
speech in the criminal justice system—so embedded that it persists even when 
the speaker intends to convey the opposite impression.  When the court in 
Grant v. Dalsheim220 attempted to insist on deliberations free from emotion, it 
 
 212 Id. at 183 (quoting WILTBANK, supra note 210, at 7). 
 213 Id. at 206 (quoting THOMAS LAYCOCK, AN ESSAY ON HYSTERIA 76 (1840)). 
 214 RICHARD W. WERTZ & DOROTHY C. WERTZ, LYING-IN: A HISTORY OF CHILDBIRTH IN AMERICA 57 
(1989) (quoting HORATIO R. STORER & FRANKLIN FISKE HEARD, CRIMINAL ABORTION: ITS NATURE, ITS 
EVIDENCE, AND ITS LAW 100–01, n.2 (1868)). 
 215 Id. 
 216 Letter from Edith Thompson to Frederick Bywaters (Aug. 15, 1922) (excerpted in GRAY, supra note 
75, at 20). 
 217 See id. 
 218 GRAY, supra note 75, at 22. 
 219 Id. at 24 (quoting Letter from T.S. Eliot to the Daily Mail (Jan. 8, 1923)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 220 Grant v. Dalsheim, 535 F. Supp. 1382 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
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ironically used language that was rife with appeals to emotion: “robust,” “ward 
off,” and “enraged.”221  More recently, a prison warden related his belief that 
“an inmate is an inmate, whether you’re female, whether you’re a male,”222 
describing the sameness in language that plays to coded stereotypes: 
To me you’re an individual, you just happen to be female.  It doesn’t 
mean that you are more slick or more sly than the male inmates.  I see 
the equivalence.  An inmate is an inmate.  I think some people who 
have stereotypes could say, “Female inmates whine a little bit more, 
they press to get their way, they keep pushing and pushing and 
pushing, or they cry.”  There are men that are that way.223 
Similarly, a Human Rights Watch Report, detailing instances of violence 
against female inmates uses language that conjures up familiar images, albeit 
less conspicuously: 
[O]fficers often target like a radar women with histories of sexual or 
physical abuse or prisoners in emotionally vulnerable positions such 
as those who lack support from family or friends, who are alienated 
or isolated by other prisoners or staff and younger women who are 
incarcerated for the first time.224 
There is something reminiscent of the depraved heart in the phrase “target like 
a radar,” although it arises not from an environment in which the rational man 
is the norm and violence is an aberration but rather from an environment in 
which violence has come to be accepted in a “culture of impunity.”  Perhaps of 
equal significance is the fact that alienation, isolation, and vulnerability are 
themes of Romanticism and call to mind Romanticism’s narratives of helpless 
women in need of protection. 
3. Context 
Professor Duncan provides examples of skillful judicial authors who 
deliberately use the associative power of language to incorporate whole 
segments of history through allusion.225  In this way, courts can easily and 
unobtrusively renew not only legal precedent but also the assumptions on 
 
 221 Id. at 1385. 
 222 JOHNSON, supra note 193, at 221. 
 223 Id. at 222 (emphasis added). 
 224 Neal v. Dep’t of Corr., No. 285232, 2009 WL 187813, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH, ALL TOO FAMILIAR: SEXUAL ABUSE OF WOMEN IN U.S. STATE PRISONS (1996), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1996/Us1.htm). 
 225 See supra notes 50–54 and accompanying text. 
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which those legal precedents depend.  In two ways, criminal law’s language—
as it describes gendered situations and defines related issues—readily and 
demonstrably slips into historical association.  Two particular uses of language 
can be found in the discourse of “Other” and, conversely, in the discourse of 
privilege. 
The discourse of “Other,” with embedded linguistic codes, can be seen in 
two cases discussed in Professor Duncan’s essay.  In McQuirter v. State, a case 
raising the question of whether one can be convicted of attempt to commit 
assault with intent to rape, the court explicitly condones the jury’s 
consideration of “social conditions.”226  This allowed the jury to consider a 
police officer’s testimony that the defendant reportedly had come to town on 
the night of the alleged crime “with the intention of getting him a white 
woman.”227  According to the officer, McQuirter planned to approach the first 
white woman he saw, and when one walked by the truck in which he was 
sitting, he got out of the truck and “watched the lady.”228  He told the officer 
“that he was going to carry her in the cotton patch and if she hollered he was 
going to kill her.”229  The reference to the prosecutrix as the “lady” coupled 
with a reference to “the cotton patch” plays on deeply entrenched racial myths 
and prejudices.  Although he denied following the woman, accosting her, or 
even making the statements attributed to him, and he had no criminal history, 
“[a]ppellant, a Negro man, was found guilty of an attempt to commit an assault 
with intent to rape.”230  On appeal, the evidence was found to be “ample to 
sustain the judgment of conviction.”231 
The previously discussed Boyd case,232 involving the murder of a white 
woman by a black man with whom she’d had an affair, provides another 
example of the contextually referential discourse of “Other.”233  In Boyd, the 
jury heard testimony about gossip and rumors circulated by the victim, saying 
that the wife of the accused was a “truck stop girl” and a “hooker.”234  Such 
words are part of a broadly inclusive set of condemnations and connote widely 
 
 226 McQuirter v. State, 63 So. 2d 388, 390 (Ala. Ct. App. 1953).  For Professor Duncan’s discussion of 
McQuirter, see Duncan, supra note 1, at 1221. 
 227 McQuirter, 63 So. 2d at 389. 
 228 Id. 
 229 Id. 
 230 Id. at 388. 
 231 Id. at 390. 
 232 See supra notes 173–76 and accompanying text. 
 233 Boyd v. State, 389 A.2d 1282 (Del. 1978). 
 234 Id. at 1284 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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accepted judgments about women’s alleged misconduct.  Negative 
connotations are inferable from any number of similar euphemisms that may 
reference any number of circumstances: sexual transactions, adultery, 
promiscuity, loss of virginity, criminality, unwillingness to submit to authority, 
poor housekeeping, lack of visible means of support, flamboyance, as well as 
many others.  Yet all have come to suggest immorality or deviance.  Frances 
Gray gives a detailed explanation of how, in social history, the phrase “bad 
woman” came to mean the same thing as whore, with the terms for slovenly 
(“slut” and “slattern”) ultimately becoming synonyms for a prostitute (i.e., a 
woman who accepts compensation for the use of her body in a sexual way).235  
Gray traces this shift in conceptualization to Shakespeare’s Othello but sees the 
phenomenon more broadly as a conflation of roles to prevent women from 
having independence.236 
The discourse of privilege includes numerous references to feudal times, 
where the authority of the state was represented by icons of power to own and 
command.  This discourse goes back at least to the time of Blackstone, who 
saw in the castle a perfect metaphor for man’s dominion over nature.237  That 
metaphor has been used for centuries in Anglo-American jurisprudence.  Davis 
v. State, a 1930 Tennessee case, for example, contains this statement: “It is not 
necessary that a defendant’s reason be dethroned to mitigate a killing to 
manslaughter.”238  In a more recent narrative, an attorney representing 
incarcerated women in a class action suit used feudal imagery to describe the 
everyday experience of women guarded by men in District of Columbia 
prisons: 
At the annex, the women had to run a gauntlet of male prisoners 
every day.  They would leave the facility and walk down the hill 
through a row of men to go eat their meals on the men’s compound.  
The men would yell obscenities about the women’s bodies and the 
staff would just look away when that happened.  This happened every 
time they had a meal, and there were three meals a day.  It was a 
highly sexualized environment . . . .239 
Discussing the situation in Neal v. Department of Corrections, the first case 
applying the Michigan Civil Rights Act to prisoners, David Fahti, Director of 
 
 235 GRAY, supra note 75, at 72–73. 
 236 Id. 
 237 See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
 238 28 S.W.2d 993, 996 (Tenn. 1930) (emphasis added). 
 239 JOHNSON, supra note 193, at 256–57 (emphasis added) (relaying an account of attorney and law 
professor Brenda Smith). 
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the United States Human Rights Watch, likened the treatment of women 
inmates to torture: “This is a problem that arises whenever you have the power 
imbalance and culture of impunity that you see in prisons.”240  By “culture of 
impunity,” he meant an environment in which those with authority enjoyed 
absolute freedom from punishment, “a culture of prison abuse that was 
executed by subordinates and tolerated by administrators.”241  Although it is 
ironic that here the castle metaphor is used in reference to violations of the law, 
it nevertheless remains true that “culture of impunity” implies a privileged 
status. 
III.  CONCLUSIONS: A DOCUMENTARY COLLAGE 
Looking at how the language of criminal law impacts women, one might 
question whether its preservation is worth the price.  Even a modest critique 
exposes drawbacks: the language covers a host of prejudices; it often affirms 
the familiar, perpetuating, whether intentionally or not, traditional norms 
that—let’s face it—have not improved the lot of most women.  This expressive 
language often creates a spectacle when respect is called for. 
And yet, the feminist critique of language in law certainly has demonstrated 
that “steno-language,” dry and imageless, is equally misleading.  A strong case 
has been made that the language of story and witness helps avoid legal 
discourse’s illusion of neutrality and scientific certainty.242  The bottom line is 
that when it comes to language, it is never a question of what but rather of how 
the language is used, and to what purpose.  It behooves us to think seriously 
about that purpose: Is it truth or justice?  Is it order and peace, or the 
preservation of a way of life with all its associated privileges and prejudices? 
This final Part uses excerpts of various texts cited in the first two sections 
of this Response, such as court opinions, news reports, academic texts 
(including Professor Duncan’s essay), true-crime stories, personal narratives, 
and testimony to demonstrate how pervasive and compelling the literary 
 
 240 Campbell, supra note 179, at 2. 
 241 Id. 
 242 See, e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE: THE LITERARY IMAGINATION AND PUBLIC LIFE 
(1995); PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 8–9 (1991); George H. Taylor, Derrick 
Bell’s Narratives as Parables, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 225, 227 (2007); Leti Volpp, 
(Mis)Identifying Culture: Asian Women and the “Cultural Defense,” 17 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 57, 80 (1994); 
see also Martha Chamallas, Feminist Constructions of Objectivity: Multiple Perspectives in Sexual and Racial 
Harassment Litigation, 1 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 95, 95 (1992); Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists 
and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411, 2435–36 (1989). 
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language of the criminal law is.  I follow an outline parallel to that employed in 
previous sections.  The collage thus covers four Parts: (A) Woman as Victim 
of Depraved Heart; (B) Seductress Generating Heat of Passion; (C) Wives and 
Lovers on the Journey to Salvation; and (D) Women as Prisoners of the Castle.  
This documentary collage is intended to break down artificial constructs of 
knowledge and provide evidence of the extent to which our assumptions about 
crime and women in the criminal justice system are subject to the power of 
language, as  detailed by Professor Duncan in her essay.  It is also an attempt 
to demonstrate, through the medium of poetic form, the importance of form 
itself and how the mode of expression affects the mode of understanding.  The 
structure of a court’s opinion takes the mind along one kind of path; a law 
review article takes it on another.  The structures of poetry, of fiction, and of 
literary essay lead the mind along different paths.  Each has value. 
The particular form used here, documentary poetry, is a relatively new 
genre, created from the “everyday debris” of writings that document and adorn 
our lives.243  The words “documentary” and “poetry” are derived, respectively, 
from root words meaning “to teach” and “to create.”244  Creators of the form 
believe that one can find in everyday publications “the sound of a poetry, a 
measure-by-placement-&-displacement, not far from our own.”245  The 
recasting of existing documentation into literary form is one way to take the 
reader along a path that leads to a deeper understanding of the words’ meaning.  
“For surely,” says Rothenberg, “it should be clear by now that poetry is less 
literature than a process of thought and feeling and the arrangement of that into 
affective utterances.”246 
We need it all: rhythm, metaphor, allusion, realism, minimalism, lyricism, 
mystery, memoir, poetry, romance; the who, what, where, and when of 
journalism; and the how and why of academic analysis.  Professor Duncan’s 
recognition of, respect for, and artful play with the English language deliver 
messages worth hearing.  Beauty of form is essential; it calls for our attention 
and demands our consideration.  As physician–poet William Carlos Williams 
tells us: 
It is difficult 
to get the news from poems 
 
 243 Introduction to 1 POEMS FOR THE MILLENNIUM, supra note 139. 
 244 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE LEGAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 546, 1397 (3d ed. 1993). 
 245 JEROME ROTHENBERG, PRE-FACES & OTHER WRITINGS 151 (1981). 
 246 Id. 
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yet men die miserably every day 
for lack 
of what is found there.247 
 
Seductive Beauty 
A Documentary Collage 
About Law, Language, and Crime 
Prologue 
In a noisy Italian restaurant, over low bowls 
of steaming eggplant parmigiana, 
an old friend startled me one evening 
by saying, “I just don’t know how 
you can work in that field.”248 
It’s the goriness, I suppose, 
all the grisly facts—neighbors 
attacking each other with a hatchet 
and carving knife in a dispute over 
a doorstop; a man stabbing his wife 
nineteen times after she taunted him 
for his passivity; and castaways slaying a boy 
to consume his flesh, when adrift 
on the high seas. 
I expect that is what she meant 
by her surprising remark.249 
I.  Victim of a Depraved Heart 
Criminal law is sensual.250 
It stirs all the senses,251 it 
can make you quiver 
with its beautiful language 
and concepts.252  Like Attempt. 
At first blush, the crime of attempt 
 
 247 WILLIAM CARLOS WILLIAMS, ASPHODEL, THAT GREENY FLOWER & OTHER LOVE POEMS 19 (1994). 
 248 Duncan, supra note 1, at 1203. 
 249 Id.  
 250 Id. 1217. 
 251 Id. 
 252 Id. at 1219.  I replaced “criminal law” in the original source with “it.” 
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may appear a little dull. . . . 
the facts . . . often listless . . . 
defendants may be found guilty if 
they are in dangerous proximity 
to the target crime, 
if they have taken the last step 
or one substantial step, . . .if 
they no longer retain 
. . . a place of repentance.253 
I have learned to savor 
attempt.254  I myself was once the victim 
of an attempted crime.255 
At a taxi stand, 
one of the drivers . . . offered me 
a free ride . . . 
I should have known better . . . . 
He urged that I sit in front 
with him, 
instead of in back, and I 
foolishly 
acquiesced.256 
[W]e were traveling fast on the highway 
and he was talking in a leering tone about my lips . . . .257 
he exited the highway and turned on a dirt road. . . . 
he stopped the car. 
He pulled me toward him 
with a rough gesture and started 
to kiss me.258 
I want women to know that 
I was abused by a man . . . 
I was used by this man, 
I was abused by this man.259 
 
 253 Id. at 1221 (internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted). 
 254 Id. at 1222. 
 255 Id. at 1224. 
 256 Id. 
 257 Id. 
 258 Id. 
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And we start to talk, 
before she took her clothes off, and then 
I don’t know.  I was driving.  I stopped. 
I parked my car; I don’t know where.  And we moved 
to the backseat . . . .  She took off her clothes. 
I don’t know.  I tried to kiss her 
or something.  Also, she asked me 
about money and I told her . . . .  I don’t, I don’t pay 
money for sex. . . .  I tried to make sex with her. 
She doesn’t want.  Then I don’t know how 
she hit me in my eyes and this moment 
I feel pain in my eyes.  I don’t remember.  I, 
I hit her and she bite me. . . .  I start to hit her, 
punch her.  I don’t know. . . .  I feel scared. 
She doesn’t move, she doesn’t talk. 
So what I can do.260 
The enticements 
of the prostitute made him 
want to see another 
nude female, which led him 
to drug, strip, and examine 
his young cousin, which 
so excited him that he 
raped her, which necessitated 
killing her, which required 
that he kill his mother.261 
Whither shall he flee, 
and how far, 
and when may he be 
permitted 
to return?262 
II.  Seductress and the Heat of Passion 
There must be a reasonable explanation 
 
 259 JOHNSON, supra note 193, at 129 (story of Marilyn). 
 260 State v. Kaddah, 736 A.2d 902, 911 (Conn. 1999) (transcript of a police interview with the defendant). 
 261 HALTTUNEN, supra note 65, at 206. 
 262 Jones v. State, 76 Ala. 8, 16 (1884) (emphasis added). 
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for the existence 
of the extreme emotional disturbance 
or distress.          It is not the person 
   who must be reasonable at the time 
      because a reasonable man would not intentionally 
kill another person; it is the frenzy of mind 
                          based upon a reasonable explanation 
      which is basic to the jury’s determination.263 
strange thoughts,    extraordinary feelings,    unseasonable appetites, 
criminal impulses,       may haunt a mind           at other times 
more innocent                            and pure.264 
                         [T]he name heat of passion 
                         is central to the meaning . . . . 
                          Essence, not accident; 
a leitmotif . . . .265 beauty is both 
objective and subjective— 
a quality of the object, 
yes,          but also 
           of the person observing . . . .266 
     Our need for beauty 
springs from the gloom and pain which 
  we experience from our destructive 
  impulses . . . ; our wish is to find in art 
evidence     of the triumph     of life 
                          over death.267 
            those fine looking women268          frail sisterhood . . . 
      a troop of gaudy poisoners,          teeming with disease269 
 
 263 Boyd v. State, 389 A.2d 1282, 1286 (Del. 1978). 
 264 Edward C. Mann, Morbid Sexual Perversions as Related to Insanity, 14 MED. BULL. 90, 94 (1892). 
 265 Duncan, supra note 1, at 1206. 
 266 Id. at 1226. 
 267 JOHN RICKMAN, On the Nature of Ugliness and the Creative Impulse, in SELECTED CONTRIBUTIONS TO 
PSYCHO-ANALYSIS 68, 88 (1957). 
 268 HALTTUNEN, supra note 65, at 204 (quoting FOOTE, supra note 113) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
COOK GALLEYSFINAL 9/10/2010  10:30 AM 
1288 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59 
array themselves in the most gay costume, adorn their persons 
                  with pearls, rings, paint, and jewels, 
        and perfume themselves     till they smell as sweet as 
                             an oriental garden270 
    stream through the streets . . . death beneath their skirts.271 
bawd, call girl, camp follower, chippie,  demi-mondaine, drab, 
     fallen woman,      fancy woman,    floozy,      grisette, 
           harlot,   hooker,   housegirl,   kept woman, 
    lady of pleasure, lady of the evening, lady of the night, 
loose woman, madam, slattern, slut, streetwalker, strumpet, 
          tart,           tramp,           trollop,       trull272 
enchant . . . bewitch 
                                                                            young men273 
              The woman who would 
                        entice the wayfarer 
  with her blandishments,          and willfully, 
   and basely            light a fire in his bones . . . 
                        should be treated 
                         as a murderess. 
    To kill such a woman could be construed, 
                like the slaying of Medusa, 
                        as an act of just 
              retribution       and collective 
                              male 
                              self- 
                           defense.274 
 
 
 269 Id. at 201 (quoting THE LIVES OF JEWETT AND ROBINSON, supra note 142, at 79) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 270 Id. at 204 (quoting FOOTE, supra note 113) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 271 Id. at 201 (quoting THE LIVES OF JEWETT AND ROBINSON, supra note 142, at 79) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 272 GRAY, supra note 75, at 72 (citing to ROSALIE MAGGIO, THE NON-SEXIST WORD FINDER: A 
DICTIONARY OF GENDER-FREE USAGE (1987)). 
 273 HALTTUNEN, supra note 65, at 204 (quoting FOOTE, supra note 113) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 274 Id. at 201 (quoting THE LIVES OF JEWETT AND ROBINSON, supra note 142, at 79) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
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III.  Wives and Lovers on a Saving Journey 
“An attempt to commit an assault with intent to rape” . . . means 
an attempt to rape which has not proceeded far enough 
to amount to assault . . . .275 
anywhere between the conception of the intent 
and the overt act . . . there is room for repentance; and the law  
in its beneficence 
extends the hand of forgiveness.276 
[T]o justify a conviction . . . the jury must be satisfied . . . 
that defendant intended to have sexual intercourse 
with prosecutrix against her will, by force 
or by putting her in fear.277 
(But when she expressed her fears . . . .)278 
I pressed charges, they gave him six months, and he went back279 
(It was horrible for him, she says, horrible.)280 
and that’s when he said he was going to kill me 
for sending him back to jail.  He281 
(became furious at her lack of faith in him 
and proceeded with his plan)282 
got out in 1986.  I hadn’t seen him, 
but he’d been looking for me. . . .  This one particular night . . . 
I was sitting in the car at the supermarket. 
Who do I see but him?283  (Almost everything 
looks different when seen from up close 
than it does from far away . . . .)284 
[Appellant] actually discovered the victim 
and his wife engaged in sexual intercourse 
in appellant’s own home. . . . the passions of any 
reasonable person would have been inflamed.285 
 
 275 Burton v. State, 62 So. 394, 396 (Ala. Ct. App. 1913). 
 276 State v. Hayes, 78 Mo. 307, 317 (1883). 
 277 McQuirter v. State, 63 So. 2d 388, 390 (Ala. Ct. App. 1953). 
 278 Duncan, supra note 1, at 1218 (parentheses added). 
 279 JOHNSON, supra note 193, at 60 (story of DonAlda). 
 280 Duncan, supra note 1, at 1218 (quotation marks omitted) (parentheses added). 
 281 JOHNSON, supra note 193, at 60 (story of DonAlda). 
 282 Duncan, supra note 1, at 1218 (parentheses added). 
 283 JOHNSON, supra note 193, at 60 (story of DonAlda). 
 284 Duncan, supra note 1, at 1244 (parentheses added). 
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‘all this stuff this boy had told me that morning 
came back to me and him riding around with his wife 
and both of them looked happy and my home 
tore all to pieces, I don’t know what happened, 
I lost control of myself.’286  (It was horrible for him.)287 
[T]he misconduct of the wife 
afforded sufficient provocation . . . .288 
When he walked up to the car, he had 
a grocery bag in his arm, and he shifted the bag. 
Then I saw the butt of the gun in there.289 
(Anywhere between the conception of the intent 
and the overt act . . . there is room for repentance . . . .)290 
So, I reached under my seat, and got the gun 
and shot out the window, and shot at him. . . . 
I was shooting out the window, just scared. . . .  I didn’t even know 
that I shot him.  I knew I grabbed the gun.  I knew I fired that gun. 
I didn’t think I hit him.  I hit him several times, I found out.291 
[T]o justify a conviction the jury must be satisfied 
that defendant intended. . . (in passion adequately provoked)292 
to have sexual intercourse . . . if there is evidence 
from which it may be inferred that . . . defendant 
intended to gratify his lustful desires . . . 
a jury question is presented. . . . 
[T]he jury may consider social conditions and customs 
founded upon racial differences, such as 
that the prosecutrix was a white woman 
and defendant was a Negro man.293 
(our normal solicitude for the life of the attacker 
is somewhat dampened when he chooses such 
historically protected premises on which to make his murderous assault.)294 
 
 285 State v. Thornton, 730 S.W.2d 309, 315 (Tenn. 1987). 
 286 Whitsett v. State, 299 S.W.2d 2, 7 (Tenn. 1957) (statement by the defendant). 
 287 Duncan, supra note 1, at 1218 (parentheses added). 
 288 Thornton, 730 S.W.2d at 314. 
 289 JOHNSON, supra note 193, at 60 (story of DonAlda). 
 290 State v. Hayes, 78 Mo. 307, 317 (1883). 
 291 JOHNSON, supra note 193, at 60 (story of DonAlda). 
 292 Drye v. State, 184 S.W.2d 10, 13 (Tenn. 1944). 
 293 McQuirter v. State, 63 So. 2d 388, 390 (Ala. Ct. App. 1953). 
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[T]he evidence in this case . . . was ample to sustain 
the judgment of conviction.295 
IV.  Prisoners of the Castle 
Testify: to make a declaration 
of truth or fact.296                    Define: to state 
                                      the precise meaning of.297                 
                                                                      Irony: the use of words to 
  express something different from 
  and often opposite to 
  their literal meaning.298 
The term malice aforethought is a false friend, 
a misleading cognate, 
like the Spanish word embarasada . . . 
What does embarasada appear to mean? 
. . . Embarrassed.  What does it mean? 
. . . Pregnant!299 
Embarrass: from the French embarrasser, to encumber, 
hamper, from Spanish embarazar, from Italian, 
imbarazzo, obstacle, obstruction, from imbarrare, 
to block, to bar.  Meaning: 
To cause to feel self-conscious or ill at ease . . . . 
To hinder with obstacles or difficulties; impede . . . . 
To interfere with (a bodily function) 
or impede the function of (a body part) . . . .300 
. . . women were shackled in labor; 
They were handcuffed 
by an arm or a leg or both 
while they were giving birth.301 
Once an irreligious, unchaste woman 
 
 294 Redondo v. State, 380 So. 2d 1107, 1111 (Fla. 1980) (parentheses added). 
 295 McQuirter, 63 So. 2d at 390. 
 296 AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, supra note 244, at 1788. 
 297 Id. at 476. 
 298 Id. at 924. 
 299 Duncan, supra note 1, at 1207 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 300 AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, supra note 244, at 583. 
 301 JOHNSON, supra note 193, at 257 (recollections of attorney and law professor Brenda Smith). 
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willing to destroy her own child 
to conceal her vicious conduct . . . 
had been spiritually transformed 
during her eight months of bondage, 
and had emerged from prison 
“Sprinkled, Cleansed, Comforted, 
a Candidate of Heaven.”302 
  Correction: Punishment 
  intended to rehabilitate 
  or improve.303 
All of them were assaulted, they testified, 
by a corrections officer . . . who resigned 
after a laundry list of rules violations . . . . 
They were also assaulted, 
sometimes raped, by other officers 
over a period of years, they told the jury. 
The women admitted 
that most of them did not report 
the abuse.  There was no point, 
they testified. The officer who assaulted 
all of them had been investigated 
20 times, he told them, 
“and they can’t touch me.”304 
Assault: from Vulgar 
Latin, to jump.305 
Rape: from Latin, to seize.306 
Abuse: Latin, improper use.307 
. . . a former director of the state 
Department of Mental Health . . . testified 
that the women were believable.  He said 
they told him of numerous incidents 
 
 302 HALTTUNEN, supra note 65, at 8 (quoting Rogers, supra note 135, at 404, 404) 
 303 AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, supra note 244, at 411. 
 304 Oppat, supra note 175. 
 305 AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, supra note 244, at 107–08. 
 306 Id. at 1450. 
 307 Id. at 8. 
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that included: Corrections officers 
groping some women for years— 
three times a day, seven days a week— 
. . . A corrections officer regularly 
crooking his finger at one woman, 
meaning she had to raise her shirt 
to display her breasts. 
. . . Orders over the public address system 
for women to go to deserted areas, 
where they would be 
sexually assaulted.308  
Grope: search blindly309 
Crook: dishonest310 
Correction: punishment311 
“Some states don’t even consider it a crime” 
for corrections officers to rape or have sex 
with the female inmates whose lives 
they control.312  A former 
corrections officer testified that . . . 
during her first midnight shift 
she saw four male officers 
go into four inmates’ rooms 
and close the doors.313  At the annex 
the women had to run a gauntlet 
of male prisoners 
every day.314 
Running the gauntlet. . . . 
a form of physical punishment 
wherein a man is compelled 
to run between two rows—a gauntlet— 
 
 308 Andy Angelo, Lawsuit Alleges Women Abused by Prison Guards, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Jan. 30, 
2008, available at http://blog.mlive.com/grpress/2008/01/lawsuit_alleges_women_abused_b.html. 
 309 AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, supra note 244, at 774. 
 310 Id. at 433. 
 311 Id. at 411. 
 312 Oppat, supra note 175 (quoting State Assistant Attorney General Allan Soros). 
 313 Id. 
 314 JOHNSON, supra note 193, at 256 (recollections of attorney and law professor Brenda Smith). 
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of soldiers who strike him 
as he passes. . . .  Running the gauntlet 
was considered far less of a dishonor 
than a beating (with exposure to ridicule) . . . 
since one could “take it like a man” 
upright and among soldiers.315  
The women 
were housed in co-ed facilities . . . . 
They would leave the facility 
and walk down the hill 
through a row of men 
to go eat their meals 
on the men’s compound.  The men 
would yell obscenities 
about the women’s bodies and 
the staff would just look away 
when that happened.  This happened 
every time they had a meal, 
and there were three meals 
a day.  It was a highly sexualized 
environment . . . .316 
In some traditions, if the condemned 
was able to finish the run 
and exit the gauntlet, at the far end, 
his faults would be deemed paid 
and he would rejoin his comrades 
with a clean slate.  Elsewhere, 
he was sent back through the gauntlet 
until death.317 
They had the power to stop it . . . 
Everyone was begging them 
. . . to stop the torture. 
They took the reports, 
 
 315 Running the Gauntlet, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Running_the_gauntlet (last visited June 
3, 2010). 
 316 JOHNSON, supra note 193, at 256–57 (recollections of attorney and law professor Brenda Smith). 
 317 Running the Gauntlet, supra note 315. 
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and did nothing.318 
We remain your daughters, 
sisters, mothers, aunts, and nieces. 
We have been separated, 
but we are not gone. 
We may be distant, 
But we are part of you. 
We may be absent, 
but we are very much 
present.319 
apology: An acknowledgement expressing regret or 
asking pardon for fault or offense . . . .320 
pardon: to release (a person) from 
punishment; exempt from penalty . . . .321 
regret: . . . from Old French, regreter: 
to weep.322 
In a gesture 
considered extremely rare . . . 
the jurors stated: 
“We, the members of the jury . . . 
would like to express 
our extreme regret 
and apologies for what 
you have been through.”323 
Epilogue 
We met 
in the same Italian restaurant as before, 
though it seemed a different place because of 
the attractive renovations.  The walls, which had 
previously shone bright yellow, were now 
a stylish pumpkin; the blinding 
 
 318 Oppat, supra note 175 (quoting plaintiff’s attorney Richard A. Soble) (quotation marks omitted). 
 319 Joyce Logan, Foreword to JOHNSON, supra note 193, at vii. 
 320 AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, supra note 244, at 8. 
 321 Id. at 1277. 
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COOK GALLEYSFINAL 9/10/2010  10:30 AM 
1296 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59 
overhead lighting had been replaced by 
the soft glow of Tiffany pendant lamps, and 
the tables, which had been crowded together, 
were separated now, resulting in 
a more peaceful ambience.  In addition 
to the altered décor, the restaurant boasted 
a new menu, so my friend and I—departing 
from our traditional eggplant parmigiana— 
ordered the apple and goat-cheese ravioli 
and lasagna.324 
 
 324 Duncan, supra note 1, at 1243–44. 
